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1INTRODUCTION
It is the responsibility of social and political science students to define and analyze
social developments in order to contribute to the formulation of suitable explanations
and, if needed, to provide solutions. In this respect, it is needed to follow recent
affairs, in order not to be late to fulfill this responsibility. Unfortunately, Turkish
scholars are usually the latecomers who follow the Western social science literature,
rather than the ones setting a course to the literature. While deciding the research
subject of this thesis, I intended to capture one of the pressing research subjects in
recent times. Consequently, I decided to study the “metropolis”, since we are living
in the “age of metropolises” (see Akay, 2001).
It can be argued that the roots of the “age of metropolises” trace back to the
Industrial Revolution. Since the Industrial Revolution, cities have been the centers of
production, consumption, administration, leisure, confrontation, uprisings and so on.
If it is legitimate to label the time period from Industrial Revolution that is late 18th
century to the 1970’s as the 1st phase of the “age of metropolises”, then we can label
the time period running since the 1970’s as the 2nd phase of the “age of
metropolises”. What lie at the core of this transition is the transformation of labor
process and regime of accumulation in production as a consequence of increasing
importance of high technologies in production, and the rising significance of the
service sector in the economic domain. In the 2nd phase of the “age of metropolises”,
we witness extreme forms of “centralization of the life” in metropolises.
Consequently, urban issues turn into one of the pressing research subjects for social
and political science students.
2In this thesis, the main concern is the spatial and social developments in both
Western and Turkish metropolises. By such a concern, it is intended to comprehend
the similarities and differences between metropolises of different societies. To do
this, I have focused on the recent changes in the spatial patterns of metropolises and
recent social developments, particularly the changing structure of lower classes. The
results of my analysis indicate a similar pattern of spatial development, namely, the
fall of interactional sites of people of different social groups and classes, a process
which points to the fall of public spaces in metropolises. On the societal side,
however, different developments are found in the metropolises, which are the
subjects of this thesis. Such a finding points to the importance of factors other than
space for social developments. Among these factors, historical-social determinants
appears to be the most important influential / determining factors. However, this does
not diminish the importance of the perspectives advocating the significance and
importance of the space and society relationship.
The recent landscape of the world metropolises is signed by decomposition
and disintegration of different quarters of different social groups and classes by
clear-cut boundaries between them. This points to the decline of the “ideal” public
space in metropolises, and its displacement by the new type of “public spaces” that is
the “public spaces” of the like-minded, like-behaving, like-earning and so on. On the
societal side, the rise of the 4th World (Akay, 2001) that is the group of people, who
are unemployed or underemployed with no social security or guarantee seems to be
the common trend. However, the speed and strength of the process of 4th
Worldization differ in different societies. In Western metropolises this process has
started by the mid 1970’s, which deposes itself by the huge literature on the
“underclass”. In Turkey, on the contrary, the formation of an “underclass” is only
3recently on the agenda. It is rather the rise of ethnic and religious cleavages with
significant conflictual characteristics that constitutes the most pressing problem.
Actually, it is this point that the importance of historical-social determinants become
visible: In Western societies, the weakness of the networks among the poor resulted
in a direct inclination towards the formation of an ‘underclass”, whereas, in Turkey,
due to deep-seated networks among the poor, the process of formation of an
“underclass” slowed down and signed by new strategies in order to prevent the
emergence of this process. The rise of ethnic and religious cleavages in Turkish
metropolises is the reflection of the new strategies to cope with poverty and to
prevent falling into the “underclass” by forming “imagined communities”.
Application of conflictual strategies in order to prevent the limited privileges in an
era marked with increased resource scarcity is one of the most important
characteristics of these “imagined communities”. It must be remembered that the
inherent conflictual characteristics is also directly related to the structure and mode
of operation of the ethnic and religious cleavages.
The reader of this thesis must be informed that due to the objectives of the
thesis, that is, the exploration of both the recent spatial and social developments in
contemporary Western and Turkish metropolises, the thesis turned into a two sided,
in other words, bilinear, study. In more concrete terms, I have analyzed two things in
a single thesis: firstly I have analyzed spatial developments as the results of societal
changes and then secondly I have focused on the consequences of social and spatial
developments in Western and Turkish metropolises. While doing these, special effort
is paid in order to fulfill one of the objectives of the thesis, namely, the presentation
of the theoretical framework of the space and society relationship and its application.
However, due to the cobweb like relationship between these two entities and other
4factors, this effort turned into a big burden. In other words, in addition to the
dialectical relationship of space and society, including various factors that affect the
relationship, providing a clear as well as non-reductionist (specifically spatial-
reductionist) picture in the physical limits of a master’s thesis became compulsory.
In order to succeed in this burden, in the first chapter of the thesis, after
providing the theoretical framework of the theory of the space and society
relationship, economic changes in Western societies after the mid-1970’s and the
effects of this process on the spatial pattern of Western metropolises are explored.
The theory of space and society relationship suggests a dialectical relationship
between space and society. In other words, each entity affects and is affected by the
other. So it is well grounded to expect to observe the influences of spatial patterns on
social developments and affairs. Corollary to this, Western social science literature
provides many examples of (urban) space’s reaction upon society. Consequently,
Chapter I continues with the exploration of the spatial pattern of Western
metropolises and its effect on the unprivileged groups of  society.
There is abundant literature on marginalization, exclusion, and the
“underclass” in Western metropolises. At first instance this implies a positive and
direct relationship between marginalization and exclusion and the formation of an
“underclass”. However, what Western literature implies does not hold true in the
Turkish case. When Turkish metropolises are analyzed, similarities with Western
metropolises are observed in social and spatial patterns with respect to
marginalization and exclusion. Informal neighborhoods and their population in
Turkish metropolises appear to be the parallel counterparts of the Western urban
periphery in social cognition. The similar territorial labeling and stigmas are attached
to the informal neighborhoods and their residents as in the case of Western
5metropolises. However, it hardly fits into the reality to argue that the informal
neighborhoods of Turkish metropolises are the sites that trigger and / or mediate the
emergence of an “underclass”. It is due to this fact that the Chapter II of the thesis is
reserved for the analyses of the historical course of the formation of informal
neighborhoods in Turkish metropolises. To do this, the rural-to-urban migration in
Turkey, its social consequences in metropolises regarding migrants are analyzed.
This effort provides us the opportunity to comprehend the socio-historical
particularities of the Turkish urban poor. Among those, “the culture of networking”
appeares to be the most important one that produces differences between the Western
and Turkish urban disadvantaged groups. Our analysis showed that, despite the
impossibility of full integration of the poor into the urban society in Turkish
metropolises, the poor enabled themselves to cope with poverty and, in some cases,
achieved an upward mobility through these networks. Also, it is found that despite
the importance of socio-historical determination, by no means the entities in time
remain constant. In other words, entities evolve with respect to the society’s
evolution, that is, a phenomenon that brings about a dynamic understanding of
society and social entities. In this way, it is shown that the networks of the poor are
in a constant process of transformation with respect to the society and their own
characteristics, which is to say newly evolving entities carry the characteristics of the
older forms out of which they come into existence.
In Chapter III, the general landscape of Istanbul, the largest metropolis of
Turkey, is examined with reference to the post-1980 military coup era’s social
developments. The results indicate again a parallelism with the Western counterparts,
namely, the crystallization of advantaged and disadvantaged groups and spatial
segregation in a single urban space, and the heavy influence of economy in shaping
6these developments. However, divergences are also visible. The role of culture in the
definitions of “friends and foes” seems to be much stronger in Turkey when
compared to the West. The most important argument in this chapter, which can also
be taken as the final remark of the thesis, is the rise of conflictual ethnic and religious
cleavages in Turkish metropolises that points to another difference in social domain
between the Western and Turkish metropolises regarding the urban periphery both in
societal and spatial terms. This points to a change in the politicization pattern of the
Turkish urban disadvantaged groups, namely, a change from politicization regarding
left and right wing ideologies to politicization regarding ethnicity and religion.
7CHAPTER I
THE DIALECTICS OF SPACE AND SOCIETY: THE WESTERN METROPOLIS
1.1 Space-Society Relationship and the City
In the long history of human species, the development of cities can be said to be a
recent phenomenon. In the course of history, first cities date back to 3000-4000 BC
located in the Nile Valley and Mesopotamia. In addition to these, there are other
forms of early cities in Crete, China, Greece and the Indus Valley (Turner, 1997,1).
Although, we call these settlements as well as countless others as “city”, the
differences between these settlements must be recognized. In this sense, it is possible
to categorize different kinds of cities in history. Their physical qualities, function,
importance, meaning, and so on may be our dimensions while doing so. Considering
these, it can be argued that the appearance of the modern large city of the
contemporary world dates back to industrial revolution (Turner, 1997, 1). However,
in order to catch particularities of the modern cities, we need to analyze them
comparatively. In sum, “city” must be studied both in time and space continuum, in
other words both historically and geographically. Certainly, this kind of a study
would provide us the opportunity to comprehend the dynamics of the city.
If we start with geographical analysis of the modern city, which is more or
less shaped with conscious efforts of planning, we find a number of dynamics that
give their forms to cities. Donald (1992, 423) states that “debates about urban
planning and architecture inevitably entailed aesthetic and psychological
considerations as well as social and political ones”. Ladd (1997, 234, cited in Dear,
2000, 255) points to the importance of cultural traditions in his examination of
German architecture and urban design. In addition to these, of course, economics is
another important and integral part of the dynamics of city formation. Turner’s
8argument about the role of industrial revolution in the onset of large cities is a direct
evidence to this fact. Keeping these in mind, it is possible to find other dynamics that
are more or less related to the above six ones.
In sum, these six dynamics and their differential interaction affect, or in
stronger terms determine, the practices on space, in specific, practices on city space.
Certainly, it is the practices on space that shape the physical, mental and social
spaces that give cities their peculiarities.
In addition to the analysis of the dynamics of practices on space that makes
differences in space and so in geography, historical analysis is required in order to
examine the ontology of dynamics of these practices. This historical analysis can be
conducted by searching the answer to an appropriate question. This question to be
answered can be formulated as follows: Do the practices on space have an
independent and separate existence or are they linked to / related to some other
“thing(s)”? Likewise, are practices on space a “thing” in itself having independent /
separate ends or are they related to some other ends? It can certainly be argued that
practices on space have no independent existence or an end in itself. Rather practices
on space are related to and an integral part of wider social processes. Practices on
space cannot be separated from social affairs and have meaning only in this social
frame. This issue becomes clear if one analyzes the practices on space with a
historical perspective. The study of the semantic of the concept of “mode of social
and spatial regulation” (Soja, 2000, 299) would provide us the means to comprehend
the issue.
91.1.1 The Influence of Society on Space
The leading scholars of urbanization formulate theories in order to understand the
contemporary city and processes taking place in the city space (see for instance, Pahl,
1975; Castells, 1977; Harvey, 1985). However, if we follow a very simple everyday
definition of the city, it would be easier to understand the relationship between the
practices on space and the social structure. For the sake of simplicity, urban space
can be defined as the geographical site of settlement of people as a totality of
quarters of different purposes, like residence, production, and consumption,
obviously with a certain observable order and regulation. This order is achieved
through certain practices on space, either conducted consciously or non-consciously.
In this respect, practices on space are the regulatory practices on space.
Of course, (regulatory) practices are neither unique to urban space nor
independent from the social structure. Rather they are the integral part of the wider
social structure. The term “regulation”, in this study, refers to conscious or non-
conscious efforts to achieve more or less institutionalized, definable patterns of
relationship between parties. As examples, the pattern of relationship between the
slave and the master, the landlord and the serf, the employer and the employee as
well as the relationship between the feminine and the masculine “entities” in
patriarchal structures can be said to be the results and appearances of this sort of
regulations.
In brief, practices on (urban) space are the integral part of social relationships.
Social relationships in human societies are constructed with respect to the
characteristics of the societies changing / transforming in the course of history. In the
contemporary world, we see modern capitalist mode of social regulations, which are
different from the previous mode of social regulations. As a result, practices on urban
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space turn to be the regulatory practices on urban space that are concordant with the
modern capitalist mode of social regulations. Actually, it is this fact that makes the
differences between the modern capitalist city and the previous forms of cities, from
ancient to feudal city.
If we sum up the argument declared until now, it can be said that aesthetics,
psychological motives and modes, social and political matters, culture and traditions,
and economics are the dimensions of the practices on space. The interplay of these
dimensions determines the way of practices on space. However, the interplay of
these dimensions does not come into existence like a free-floating bottle in the ocean.
Rather the interplay of these dynamics is in accordance with the historical
characteristics of the social life. In other words, they are an integral part of the
general conduct of the social life. In this respect the practices on space turn to be the
regulatory practices on space that have their roots in the mode of social regulations
of a specific time period.
Soja (1989, 120) states that:
The generative source for a materialist interpretation of spatiality is
the recognition that spatiality is socially produced, and like society
itself, exist in both substantial forms (concrete spatialities) and as a
set of relations between individuals and groups, an ‘embodiment’,
and medium of social life itself. ... In their appropriate interpretive
contexts, both the material space of physical nature and the
ideational space of human nature have to be seen as being socially
produced and reproduced. Each needs to be theorized and
understood, therefore, as ontologically and epistemologically part
of the spatiality of social life.      
And Dear (2000, 119-120) states that:
Planning is about power. It is concerned with achieving urban
outcomes that serve the purpose of powerful agents in society.
Since there are many such agents, planning is also about the
process of conflict, as agents attempt to maneuver to achieve their
ends. The multiplicity of ends that characterize most land-use
disputes is simply a reflection of the diverse intentionalities that the
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various agents bring to dispute. In this context, intentionality is
meant to convey nothing more complex than purpose, goal or
motive. In our society, markets, legal systems, and governments are
examples of institutional frameworks through which individuals
and groups can express intentionality. Sometimes, when larger
coalitions form to express collective intentionality, we may speak
of a civic will. On occasion, of course, small powerful groups may
also find ways by which to express their intentionality as a civic
will. ... (F)or most of the twentieth century the urban planning
apparatus has become increasingly ensconced as part of the
bureaucratic apparatus of state.
In these two quotations, the link between social life and spatiality and
practices on space is clearly stated. In fact this cluster of arguments are in
concordance with the “city as a text” approach. As Donald (1992, 422) puts it, “the
city, then, is above all a representation” in the sense that it constitutes a coherence
and integrity of “interaction of historically and geographically specific institutions,
social relations of production and reproduction, practices of government, forms and
media of communication and so forth”. It is an imagined environment in the sense
that it was brought into existence by imagination and design, since there was not
such a thing before.
Lefebvre (1991, 26) states that “(social) space is a (social) product”. In his
effort to describe this assertion, he provides information about the interrelation
between the practices on space and the characteristics of the historical epoch, and he
uses the term “mode of production” to define the historical epoch. “(E)very society –
and hence every mode of production with its sub-variants (i.e. all  those societies
which exemplify the general concept) – produces a space, its own space” (emphasis
added). Lefebvre (1991, 46) then continues to argue that “since, ex hypothesi, each
mode of production has its own particular space, the shift from one mode of
production to another must entail the production of a new space”. Being a dialectical
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Marxist, Lefebvre does not speak of only economy but also of politics in his
explanation of the production of space (Dear, 2000, 49).
The increasing concern for not to be an economic determinist makes leading
scholars to emphasize other realms than the economic realm. By this, they gain
capability to go beyond the simplistic explanations of the model of the infrastructure
and superstructure duality and come up with more comprehensive explanations. One
of the schools in this line is the Parisian Regulation School, which provides
important insight for the scholars of urban issues.
The appeal of regulation theory for urban political theorists,
however stems from three main sources. First it presents an account
of the changing character of capitalist economies and the role of
cities within them. It thus provides a context against which to
discuss urban political change. Second, it examines the connections
and interrelations between social, political, economic and cultural
change ... Third ... (f)or regulation theory, economic change
depends upon, and is partly the product of, changes in politics,
culture and social life (Painter, 1993, 276).
Regulation theory refers to two concepts to understand and analyze the
variations in the character of capitalism with regard to time and space. These
concepts are the “regime of accumulation” and “mode of regulation”.
The regime of accumulation refers to a set of
macroeconomic relations which allow expanded capital
accumulation without the system being immediately and
catastrophically undermined by its instabilities...a regime of
accumulation may be identified when rough balances
between production, consumption and investment, and
between the demand and supply of labor and capital allow
economic growth to be maintained with reasonable stability
over a relatively long period.
However, this stability cannot arise simply as the result
of the operation of the defining core processes of the
capitalism ... Rather it is generated in and through social and
political institutions of various sorts, cultural norms and even
13
moral codes. Such norms and codes are not set up for the
purpose of sustaining a regime of accumulation, but they can
sometimes interact to produce that effect. When this happens,
they constitute a mode of regulation also referred to as ‘mode
of social regulation’ or MSR (Painter, 1993, 277-278).
It is the “hegemonic structure” that forms the “concrete historical connection”
between the “regime of accumulation” and institutional, normative, social, and
political regulations that turn these regulations into MSR. Thus, MSR maintains the
equilibrium and stability in order to reproduce the system through institutional forms,
networks and norms. It is the “non-hegemonic phases” that social struggles persist as
a result of which a new form of accumulation and regulation emerges (Esser and
Hirsch, 1995, 74).
In this frame, and by the light of previous arguments, it can be inferred that
city and the regulatory practices on (city) space can be regarded as both the means
and the result of the MSR: in order to strengthen the “hegemonic structure”, special
spatial regulations are required and the regulations turn to be the aspects of MSR
when the “hegemonic structure” is established.
In sum, practices on space are the products of social affairs. In this sense,
society and space on which society “operates” are two distinct but highly dependent
entities. Up to now only one side of the relationship between space and the social,
that is the effect of the social on space, is discussed. However, as Lefebvre (1970, 25,
cited in Soja, 1989,81) puts it, “space and political organization of space express
social relationships but also react upon them”, upon which the following section
dwells.
14
1.1.2 The Influence of Space on Society
The above quotation from Lefebvre summarizes the dialectical relationship between
society and space. Thus, at the other side of the equation, we find the effects of
(social) space on society. Soja (1989, 120-121), in his analysis of materialist
interpretation of human geography and history, explains the logic of this kind of a
perspective as the mutual effect of society and physical and biological processes. At
the expense of repeating the arguments above, the space we are dealing with is the
social space, not merely natural space. But this does not make any difference in the
general logic of the relationship; rather if there is a difference, it is the more visible
mutual relationship. In fact, the effect of space on society is not a surprising process
since every individual, every society and every civilization occupies a place in space.
Social relations take place in space.
Before producing effects in material realm (tools and objects),
before producing itself by drawing nourishment from that realm,
and before reproducing itself by generating other bodies, each
living body is space and has its space: it produces itself in space
and it also produces that space. This is truly remarkable
relationship: the body with the energies at its disposal, the living
body, creates or produces its own space; conversely, the laws of
space, which is to say laws of discrimination in space, also govern
the living body and the deployment of its energies (Lefebvre, 1991,
170, emphasis added). Activity in space is restricted by that space;
space ‘decides’ what activity may occur, but even this ‘decision’
has limits placed upon it. Space lays down the law because it
implies a certain order – and hence a certain disorder (just as what
may be seen defines what is obscene) (Lefebvre, 1991, 143).
From these arguments it can be inferred that regulatory practices on urban
space, which are the outcomes of patterns of societal relationships, have effects on
societal relationships as well. The effect of practices on (city) space can be either
relatively positive or negative for the particular individuals, social groups or classes
since social space “permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and
prohibiting yet others” (Lefebvre, 1991, 73). Dear’s above statement about the power
15
relations embedded in urban planning may gain meaning when we consider the
social effects of social space. Having argued for the importance of planning as a tool
for domination over the different segments of society, however, it must be noted that
what planners intend to produce as social outcomes and real experiences of people
are hardly in accordance with each other (Donald, 1992, 435-437). That is, we can
talk about the difficulty of the powerful to master through what they produce in order
to maintain their mastery (Lefebvre, 1991,63). This is because of the contradictions
due to the duality of the produced space “as both outcome / embodiment / product
and medium / presupposition / producer of social activity” (Soja, 1989, 129).
1.2 The Dynamics of Spatial Structure in the Western Contemporary World:
The Influence of Economy
If the practices on (social) space are produced by social relationships, which, in turn,
affect society, different social spaces must be produced in different stages of human
history. That is to say, the social space in feudal Europe, for instance, must be
different from social space in the period of industrial revolution, which must be then
different from the ‘Post-Fordist’ social space of contemporary times. If that is the
case, it would be necessary to explore the “ways” of social relationships in a given
time period in order to comprehend the social space.
Althusser (1969, 202, cited in Saunders, 1981, 185) defines three levels of
social complexity, namely, economic, political and ideological. He continues to
argue that in the historical process, in each mode of production, one of the three
levels becomes dominant. The dominant level, which is at the final analysis
determined by  economic relations, has the determining role of social life. In
capitalist mode of production, it is the economic level that has the determining role.
A similar understanding with Althusser’s notion of dominant level exists in
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Sztompka’s (1991, 130) theoretical framework. The dominational feature of
structures at the structural level between different levels of structures results in a
form of  “domination of some structures among others, results in a precarious
balance at the level of structures”. From the four levels of social structure, namely,
normative, ideal, interactional and opportunity levels,  one or more dominant levels
has / have the influential power over the other levels. But holding a perspective that
rejects a static vision of society, Sztompka notes that the dominance of the levels are
and can be changing. The levels of structures are in constant transformation so
different levels of social structure can be dominant, or more than one level can
constitute a dominant bloc. Also the balance may differ in time and space.
The notion of different levels provides us a useful tool to comprehend the
complexity of social life. Also by the notion of different levels, one can gain insight
into the different regulatory processes that take place in societal life in general and in
city life in particular.
However, it is necessary to identify the dominant level in the time and space
continuum in order not to lead to a mess of arguments and assumptions that lacks
definitional character. As noted above, while Sztompka holds a more dynamic
version, according to Althuser it is economy that holds the dominant feature in
capitalist mode of production. In the literature concerning mode of social regulation
and practices on (city) space in developed countries, economic level, and specifically
the transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, has acquired significant emphasis.
1.2.1 Fordism and Social Structure
It was the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci who first used the term “Fordism”
in the 1930’s. Today the term is used to refer to the ‘long boom’ that took place in
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the world economic history between 1945 and 1974 (Painter, 1993, 278).  Following
Jessop (1992, in Painter, 1993, 278), we can identify four important characteristics of
Fordism, namely, labor process as Taylorism (Esser and Hirsch, 1995,75) involving
the moving assembly line, the regime of accumulation as “virtuous circle of growth
based on mass production and mass consumption”, the mode of regulation which is
the Keynesian Welfare State, and mode of socialization, which is marked with the
overall impact of the above aspects of Fordism.
It is evident that this is a general picture and there have been differences for
all of the four aspects of Fordism in different regions of the world. However this
general frame can help us to understand the general operation of the Fordist economy
and its impact on social life, since Jessop’s four-folded categorization is a well-
organized and complementary description of the general aspects of Fordism.
One of the important features of the Fordist economy regarding our subject is
its ability to create an expanded middle class. This expansion of the middle class
between the rich and the poor softened the social stratification and so provided the
means of social mobility especially for the upwardly mobile lower classes.
According to Sassen (1994,99), manufacturing as the leading sector of Fordist
economy, with wage levels that are at the level to create enough demand to promote
consumption, and modeling of the leading sectors by other sectors of the economy,
were the most important contributors to the creation of the means of expansion of the
middle classes. Social policies promoting “social wage, government planning of
economic and social life” and “application of bureaucratic principles” (Painter, 1993,
283-284) also contributed to this process.
Despite the appearance of social consensus in welfare states, it was the hidden
struggles that resulted in the expansion of welfare provisions in society. In this
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respect, it can be argued that it is the unifying character of the Fordist assembly line
mass production of manufacturing that supplied the opportunity of acquiring welfare
provisions for the working class. Labor unions and parties lie at the core of this
process as being the tools / weapons of the working class for their struggle in order to
get welfare provisions. Thus, as an outcome of the “stable legitimization of
sociopolitical relationships supported by growth (and) consumption” (Esser &
Hirsch, 1989,421, in Kennet, 1994, 1020), “institutionalized class conflict” should be
regarded as the determining factor of the Fordist mode of regulation as Keynesian
welfarism expanded in society.
As a result, “the dilemmas of urban marginality and social destitution” were
solved efficiently by the wage-labor relationship in the Fordist era (Wacquant, 1996,
124) at least for the unionized sections of the workforce. However, in order not to be
misleading, it has to be noted that social goods, such as social housing, were not
distributed equally in the different sections of society, specifically to all sections of
the working class (Mallpass & Murrie, 1987,74, in Kennet, 1994, 1021). For
example, housing provisions were given to the politically organized sections of the
working class (Harloe, 1981, in Kennet, 1994, 102) as a means of ideological
legitimization and corruption, which is the “materialization of ideology” (Hay, 1992,
in Kennet, 1994,1021).
Certainly, there are identifiable reflections of “Fordist society” on the
regulatory practices on (city) space. The most visible / crystallized practice on the
Fordist urban space is the provisions of public housing (Kennet, 1994). Kennet
(1994, 1019) defines this by the term “the ‘golden age’ of social rented housing”.
According to Painter (1993), suburbanization in the U.S. and the planned land use
and infrastructural provisions in the United Kingdom were the Fordist regulatory
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practices in urban areas. Castells’s 1977 dated work “The Urban Question” is the
theoretical reflection of the social processes in Fordist city, with the
conceptualization of city as the site of “collective consumption”.
1.2.2 Post-Fordism and Social Structure
It is without doubt that from the mid 1970’s, the world economic system has been
facing a period of transformation. Transition from Fordist to Post-Fordist economy
as well as globalization of economy lie at the core of this process. The changes can
be briefly summarized as the increasing number and intensity of professional and
service activities in economic life at the expense of declining manufacturing and
customization, flexible specialization, increased importance of networks of
subcontractors, and informalization at the expense of mass production. The
destabilization of jobs and flexible economic activities that reflect in increased
number of part-time and temporary jobs, and the tendency toward short term
employment (Sassen, 1994,100-103) are the consequences of these major changes.
As the result of the transformations in the labor process, Painter (1993, 280)
points to the “increased polarization between a multi-skilled (or at least multi-tasked)
core workforce and an unskilled ‘peripheral’ workforce recruited from politically
marginalized social groups”. A similar argument about the influence of the changing
character of the labor process in Post-Fordist economy comes from Castells. He
(1998) argues for a distinction between generic and self-programmable labor as a
result of no reprogramming capacity of the former, and an embodiment of knowledge
that enables the laborer to “reprogram himself / herself towards endlessly changing
tasks of the production process” for the latter. As a consequence, generic labor’s
status / role is reduced to the status / role of a machine. Furthermore, mechanization,
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automatization and computerization make production more dependent on capital
rather than on the low-status labor (Van Kempen and Marcuse1997, 287). However,
this does not give an end to the function of the unskilled labor in the production
process. As Sassen (1994, 105) claims, there is structural need for both high skilled
and high paid professional labor and contrastingly low skilled and low paid labor,
such as secretaries, maintenance workers, and cleaners. This low skilled, low paid
labor is an integral and key component of the new economic life, according to
Sassen.
However, this development in the production process, namely polarization
and hence inner fragmentation of the workforce, results in the loss of the means and
capacity of forming strong unions and political parties. As a consequence, large
portions of the workforce, namely, the unskilled labor, has lost its bargaining power
against the capital (Van Kempen and Marcuse, 1997, 287), which was an important
means for the expansion of welfare provisions in the Fordist era.
As a result of the change in the “labor process”, increasing portions of the
workforce are being excluded, marginalized or devalued in economic life (Painter,
1993, 286) as well as in social life. The loss of labor market security, income security
and employment security that were granted in the “Fordist Keynesian social
contract” (Wacquant, 1996, 124) became the causes and consequences of
marginalization.
It is clear from the above arguments that economic marginalization and / or
unemployment are the results of structural changes in economic life. The ones who
are excluded or marginalized are the victims of this structural change. It is surprising
to realize that these excluded or marginalized groups as a consequence of structural
changes fit into what Myrdal labeled as the “underclass” in the 1940’s. The decline
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of the Keynesian Welfare State and the emergence of the Schumpeterian Workfare
State as a consequence of the Post-Fordist economy, which “in contrast to the
Keynesian Welfare State of Fordism, ... would: ‘promote product, process,
organizational, and market innovation and enhance the structural competitiveness of
open economies mainly through supply-side intervention; and to subordinate social
policy to the demands of labor market flexibility and structural competitiveness’
(Jessop, 1993, 19)” (Painter, 1993, 286) accelerates this process and contributes to
the increased polarization in society, which is manifested in terms of socioeconomic
inequalities.
The observations on the new fragmentation and grouping of the workforce in
the Post-Fordist economy can be categorized into two significant theses, namely the
mismatch thesis and the polarization thesis. The mismatch thesis, on the one hand,
argues that:
The increase in the educational and skill demands of the urban
economy has outstripped the skills of an increasingly large
segments of the urban population. Thus, ... populations that have
traditionally relied on low skilled employment will no longer have
this access to the urban job market (Bailey and Waldinger,
1991,44,in Van kempen and Ozuekren, 1998,1646).
The polarization thesis, on the other hand, suggests that middle class jobs are
disappearing, and high and low class jobs are increasing. In this hypothesis, in
contrast to the mismatch thesis, there is place for low skilled labor but the means of
upward mobility has been diminishing (Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1998,1646).
Actually, the reality seems to be that while large portions of unskilled workforce are
excluded from economic life as a result of mechanization, automatization and
computerization (resembling the premises of the mismatch thesis), there is a
widening gap between the unskilled labor, who are able to protect their position in
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economic life against automatization, and the skilled labor, in privileges,
opportunities and so on (resembling the premises of polarization thesis). Thus, we
can categorize society into two as the privileged (the skilled labor and the upper
class) and the non-privileged (containing all sections of unskilled labor either
excluded from the workforce or not, as all being uncertains).
To sum up, it can be said that, in the Fordist era, the regime of accumulation
and the Taylorist labor process provided the means of integration of the labor in
social and political domains. This resulted in standardized, normalized,
individualized, bureacratically articulated mass society. “Bureacratically realized
egalitarianism” and “statist social reforms” were the means of the Fordist mass
society  (Hirsch, 1991,69). As a result, “monopolistic mode of regulation” of
centralized corporatism and Keynesian Welfare state was on the agenda (Peck, 1994,
152; Hirsch, 1991, 69; Esser and Hirsch, 1995, 76). All these gave way to inclusion
of the workforce (Esser and Hirsch, 1995, 76) into mainstream society. While in the
Fordist era we see the integration of the society as a whole as a result of regulatory
practices, in the Post-fordist era, on the contrary, we face with a somewhat reverse
picture, of fragmentation of the workforce and its reflections in society due to
flexible accumulation and flexible regulation (Peck, 1994, 152). The effective
regulations are shrinking, resulting in the “disintegration of the historic block formed
at the level of nation state by the accumulation and the regulation nexus”, increasing
political and social conflict (Hirsch, 1991, 72). As a result, in the Post-Fordist era,
social selection and discrimination are on the agenda rather than social acceptance, as
it was in the Fordist era.
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1.2.3 The Impacts of Post-Fordism on the Western City Space
Following the previous arguments on the dialectical relationship between the social
and social space, it is not surprising to observe the consequences of economic and
regulatory changes in the city space.  Wacquant (1999, 1641) claims that all leading
capitalist countries, which have expanded their Gross National Product  (GNP) and
increased their common-wealth over the past three decades, face with flourishing
“opulence and indigence, luxury and penury, copiousness and deprivation” together.
Thus the city of Hamburg, by some measurements the richest city
in Europe, sports both the highest proportions of millionaires and
the highest incidence of public assistance receipt in Germany,
while New York City is home to the largest upper class on the
planet but also to the single greatest army of homeless and destitute
in the Western hemisphere (Mollenkopf and Castell, 1991)
(Wacquant, 1999, 1641).
From this argument, it can be concluded that there appears a positive correlation
between economic expansion and poverty.
The polarization in world cities is reflected in the social space of residential
areas. In fact, spatial segregation and concentration1 are the appearances of new
social space as a result of this process. The relationship between economy, social
polarization and spatial segregation would be better understood from the below
schema, taken from O’Loughin and Friedrichs (1996, 15).
                                                
1In order to defeat any confusion, it is needed to define what is meant by the term spatial segregation
and spatial concentration. “Spatial segregation can be seen as the residential separation of groups
within a broader population. A group is said to be completely mixed in a spatial sense when its
members are distributed uniformly throughout the population. The greater the deviation from a
uniform dispersal the greater the degree of segregation” (Johnston et al., 1986, in Van Kempen and
Özuekren, 1998, 1632). “By definition, spatial segregation implies spatial concentration. If an area
(neighborhood) displays an overrepresentation of a certain group (compared to, for example, the share
of the group in the city as a whole), we speak of a concentration area for that group” (Van Kempen
and Özuekren, 1998, 1632).
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National level restructuring of the labor market
Urban level Percent employed in “old” industries




Social housing market: demand > supply
Neighborhood level
Socio/Spatial polarization (number of depressed neighbor hoods,
concentration of households below poverty level)
Figure 1.1) Theoretical model relating economic change, social polarization and residential
segregation
Significantly, Marcuse (1989, 697) stresses on misleading features of the
“dual city metaphor”, a concept that can easily be interpreted as emerging as a result
of what Kennet (1994, 1029) calls “exclusionary welfare policies”:
“Talk of a ‘dual city’” is popular lately. The metaphor is in various
forms. Most frequently, it is used as the description of the
increasing polarization of society between the rich and the poor,
haves and have-nots. The formulation varies –‘dual city’, ‘two
cities’, ‘city of light and city of darkness’, ‘dualism in the city’ or
by analog, ‘formal and informal sectors’, ‘sunbelt and snow belt’-
but the thrust is the same” (Marcuse, 1989, 697).
While on the one hand, the dual city concept is advantageous as it highlights
“a growing inequality and sense of division in society”, on the other hand it has
disadvantages for several reasons (Marcuse, 1989, 698). The three important
disadvantages of the concept are its suggestion of one-dimensional and quantitative
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division between parts, implication of “the conclusion that redistribution, rather than
changes in the causes of the undesired distribution” as the solution, and being
ahistorical (Marcuse, 1989, 698). As a conclusion, Marcuse insists on the need to
explore the new and qualitatively distinct forms of division in society and cities in
the historical process as a consequence of structural changes. So it is needed to
analyze the process in a more detailed way rather than simply concluding that there
emerges duality in the city.
Marcuse (1993, 356) defines five groups of quarters of a city in the
contemporary world as follows: luxury housing, gentrified city, suburban city,
tenement city and abandoned city. He continues to argue that luxury-housing
quarters contain the section of the society that is at the top of economic, social, and
political hierarchy. Gentrified city contains the professional-managerial-technical
groups. It is the skilled workers and mid-range professionals and upper civil servants
that reside in suburban city. Tenement city contains blue-white collar lower paid
workers. Finally, it is the abandoned city that contains the unemployed and excluded
ones.
While in his 1993 study, Marcuse talks about the expansion of “certain
quarters” in size, namely the gentrified and the abandoned cities, and the shrinking of
the others, notably the tenement city, in his 1997 study, he emphasizes the
developments in three quarters, namely, the ghetto (abandoned city), the suburbs and
the luxury / upper class residence, as key developments in contemporary cities.
Despite this shift in Marcuse’s observation, the main premise of his argument
remains the same, that is, the increasing division and separation of quarters of
different socioeconomic classes.
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Apart from the widening gap between the quarters, that is, the disappearing of
the center or intermediate ones, there is a more serious process going on in the Post-
Fordist city space. Barricades rather than boundaries, tangible or intangible, symbolic
or actual, promote this process, which is called walling (Marcuse, 1996, 249; 1993,
360). According to Marcuse (1996, 244), the walling of the quarters is due to
establishing order in the city. Since the residents of the different quarters are in a
hierarchical order due to their power and wealth (Marcuse, 1996, 244), the walling
processes have different meanings and consequences for different quarters and their
residents, namely, for the abandoned city it is exclusion; for the suburbs, it is
intermediation and insurance of the residents’ economic, political and social
relationships from the outside community and protection from the dangers coming
from “below”; and for the luxury / upper class residences, it is protection and
enhancing the position of their residents. Marcuse’s (1996, 248-249) metaphorication
or definition of the walls as prison walls for the abandoned city, barricades for the
tenement city, walls of aggression for the gentrified city, stucco walls for the
suburban city, and castle walls for the dominating city, that is, the luxury / upper
class city, well illustrates the different meanings and consequences of the “walling
process”. This process results in the transformation of the earlier ghetto into the
excluded ghetto, the suburbs into exclusionary enclaves, and the luxury /upper class
residences into fortified and totalizing citadels. This is stated as follows: “the
increasing separation of each from the other and from other parts of the city through
fortification, walling in (for the ghetto) and walling out (for the exclusionary
enclaves and citadels), and increasing totalizing internalization of the environment
for all aspects of daily life” (Marcuse, 1997, 315).
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Despite the arguments about the effects of economy on city space presented
above, spatial organization does not merely result from economic developments.
Indeed the overarching phenomenon of increased separation of the parts of the city
from each other is the reflection of increasing economic, social, political (Marcuse,
1997,311) and ideational separation, which is a consequence of the non-monopolist
regulation of Post-Fordism.
1.3 The Impact of the Post-Fordist Space on Society: Loss of Public Space and
Its Consequences
Until now, the transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, transformations of the labor
process and the mode of social regulations as the results of this transition, and their
effects on city space are explored through the literature review. Once more it has to
be noted that the literature is highly concentrated on economy rather than other
domains of the social structure, supporting Althusser’s argument on the dominance
of economic level in capitalism. However, by referring to the American social
sciences literature, non-economic levels of social structures will be emphasized in
the following part of the chapter. This will be done by following a political economy
approach to conceptualize the non-economic levels. The premise of this effort can be
explained briefly as follows: in modern times, non-economic levels gain significance
as the result of economic processes. In turn, after exceeding a threshold level, non-
economic levels gain an independent existence with considerable influential power
on society, which, then, cannot be explained merely by the economic perspective
anymore. So, as the result of economy, the ideational, political and social levels
come into existence as the aspects of social structure.
Following the “social space’s reaction upon society” perspective presented
above, in order to explore the new relations in city space, in the following parts the
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effect of the new social space on society and its different domains will be explored.
“The reaction of space upon society” can be observed in four domains, namely, the
economic, social, ideational and political.
The main effects of the new spatial order of Post-Fordist city are the limited
participation in civil society by the residents of abandoned neighborhoods (Van
Kempen and Özuekren, 1998, 1633), social isolation (Van kempen, 1997), and in
sum the destruction of public space that would bring different groups together (see
Davis, 1990, 221-265). This main effect has also sub-effects that need elaboration.
One of the mostly debated sub-effects is the formation of symbolic barriers as a
result of socio-spatial isolation, which then affects “objective” consequences. Among
the symbolic barriers, the stigma attached to poor neighborhoods is of considerable
importance.
1.3.1 Territorial Isolation and Stigma as a Symbolic Barrier Acting Against
Poor Neighborhoods
The most important dimensions of stigmatization with respect to the focus of the
study can be classified into two categories as the instrumentality of stigmatization
and its consequences.
Territorial labels, with their emphasis on socio-spatial segregation
and separation, serve social control and especially the exclusionary
mode of social control with its practice of social isolation (Cohen,
1985, p.25). From this point of view, territorial labeling is not
merely a subjective appreciation of a deviant situation by
mainstream society but a social instrument as well. Central to
labeling theory is the definition of deviance as “the infraction of
some agreed-upon rule.” “Social groups create deviance by making
rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those
rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders” (Becker,
1963, p.9, emphasis added). From this point of view, territorial
stigmas thus reflect both the powerless position of the inhabitants
involved and a verdict to social exclusion by mainstream society.
This “verdict” makes the place where one lives a factor in its own
right by affecting the attitudes and behavior of important others,
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such as employers or officials who are responsible for the
implementation of social rights (Van Kempen, 1997, 437-438).
The media and even social scientists have important, conscious and / or non-
conscious contribution to the “exclusionary mode of social control” in terms of their
conceptualizations and / or re-conceptualizations of the already existing concepts.
The evolution and the popular use of the term “underclass” is a well known example
that constitutes a fertile ground to comprehend the question of discrimination and / or
exclusion of some members of society by the other members. Although coining of
the term “underclass” goes back to the 1962 by Myrdal (Gans, 1993, 327), it is in the
last two decades that the term “underclass” became a considerable subject of
research in academic and popular writings. This fact can be considered as an
awareness of the increasing polarization in contemporary societies, especially in the
USA and Western Europe, and of the results of this process, that is, the exclusion of
certain individuals and groups.
By the term “underclass” Myrdal intended to point to the increasing number
of workers who are “forced to the margins of the labor force in a new and permanent
way”(Myrdal, 1962, cited in Gans, 1993, 327). It was the changing nature of
American economy that gave rise to “an unprivileged class of unemployed,
unemployables and underemployed who are more and more hopelessly set apart from
the nation at large and do not share in its life, its ambitions and its achievements”
(Myrdal, 1962, 10, cited in Gans, 1993, 327). By the end of the 70’s, the term turned
to be a behavioral term. The “criminal, deviant, or just non-middle class ways” of
behavior became to be the main argument in the definitions of the term “underclass”.
The culture of poverty thesis of Oscar Lewis and Banfield’s work on “lower class”
contributed to this transition from structural to behavioral understanding of the term
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(Gans, 1993, 327-328). As an influential one, the culture of poverty thesis stresses on
the “lack of a will to work” and psychological unpreparedness to take “advantages of
the changing conditions” as a result of children’s internalization of attitudes and
values of the subculture into which they are born, which is characterized by poverty
(Morris, 1993, 405).  Later on the term coincided with race (Gans, 1993, 327), which
was parallel to the emergence of the behaviorist approach to the issue. Then, writings
about the emergence of a ‘dangerous’ Black underclass and similar cautious writings
began to be published (Gans, 1993, 328). Katz (1997) asks the question of “why the
term underclass rocketed into public discourse in the late 1970’s.” His answer is as
follows:
My own view is that underclass serves as a metaphor for three
interconnected understandings of the current scene in America’s
inner cities. I call them novelty, complexity and danger. The
situation in inner cities is unprecedented; it has several intersecting
components; and it threatens the safety and well being of both
individuals and society (1997, 355).
As a result of danger and threat, there appeared a need for a new regulation
and the term “underclass” as an instrumental / functional conceptualization came into
being.  If one takes Wacquant’s (1993) argument into account, which points to the
use of behavioral terms as a means of exoticizing, the effect of academic and popular
writings on exclusionary regulations would be clearer.
In this sense, the consequences of stigmatization based on spatial isolation are
also important for the patterns of social relationships. One of them is the lack of
information of residents about available jobs (Burges et al. 1997, inVan Kempen and
Özuekren, 1998, 1633; Van Kempen , 1997, 435). It is self evident that this situation
will further worsen the economic conditions of the residents of poor neighborhoods.
There are also problems in terms of the means of collective consumption
supplied to poor neighborhoods (Van Kempen and Özuekren, 1998, 1634; Van
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Kempen, 1997, 438). Even if services like education, health care and pork barrels are
supplied, the quality of these services is questionable (see Van Kempen, 1997, 438).
Poor neighborhoods and their residents may be viewed as undeserving these social
services (Van Kempen, 1997, 438-439). Furthermore, unprivileged residents are
incapable to figure out their needs, the means to get the services they need and have
lower expectation in terms of the quality of services (Van Kempen and Özuekren,
1998, 1634; Van Kempen, 1997, 438). This is the “institutional desertification” in
Wacquant’s terms (Wacquant, 1998, in Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1998, 1634).
Thus, the absence of information networks in order to find jobs and
institutional desertification and social isolation, which are analyzed above, are the
destructive consequences of stigmatization for the stigmatized. It is actually a
circular phenomenon: the more the loss of social interaction, and the more
stigmatization, the more stigmatization, the more loss of social interaction.
“Demonization”, “being a symbol of urban pathology” in terms of “moral
dissolution”, “cultural depravity”, and “behavioral deficiencies”, as in the American
case, are the outcomes of territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 1993, 371). If we sum
up all these, it can be argued that stigmatization erodes the means of integration of
the stigmatized into the mainstream society and the means of upward mobility in
order to escape from their unprivileged socio-economic position.
1.3.2 Fear in the Contemporary City: Political Marginalization of the Poor
In addition to economic, social and ideational changes, contemporary societies also
face with changes in the political domain. Actually the above arguments about the
transition from “welfarism” to “workfarism” provide the frame of the political
changes at the national level. Hirsch (1991, 73-74) argues that there is a change
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towards concentration and monopolization of state policies that promotes strategic
changes in favor of the market and at the expense of social security systems and
welfare provisions. As stated above, the softening of social stratification and
expansion of the middle classes were a result of welfare policies in the Fordist era,
which in turn contributed to social consensus and peace. Accordingly, in the
contemporary world and city, we face with a widening gap between different social
groups and classes as a result of political, as well as social, economic and ideational
changes. This, in turn, affects social policies. The return of the security state (Hirsch,
1991, 74) is the manifestation of this process. Also the “walling out” of the
unprivileged, which is discussed above, is the reflection of the fear of and perceived
threat coming from the unprivileged in society, which in turn strengthens the already
existing fears.
Actually, the dominating / ruling groups and classes may not be unjust or
wrong to fear from “internal threats”. Bhala and Lapeyre (1999, 27) argue that
economic marginalization and social disintegration cause political marginalization
and polarization in society. As a result, radicalization and inclination away from
mainstream politics of the unprivileged is an expected outcome in the contemporary
city.
1.3.3 Territorial Alienation and the Loss of Hinterland
Apart from but related to the above arguments, today’s city embraces a set of new
trends. These are “territorial alienation and dissolution of ‘place’” and the “loss of
hinterland” (Wacquant, 1996), especially in the case of abandoned quarters. The first
one is:
(The) loss of locale that marginalized urban populations identify
with and feel secure in ...consistent with the change of both ghetto
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and banlieue from communal ‘places’ suffused with shared
emotions, joint meanings and practices and institutions of
mutuality, to indifferent ‘spaces’ of mere survival and contest
(Wacquant, 1996, 126).
So ‘place’, which was once a “common resource” in which one felt secure,
turned into a ‘space’ in which one feels insecure and threatened (Smith, 1987, 297, in
Wacquant, 1996, 126). It has to be noted that this shift is a consequence of territorial
stigmatization to a certain extent (Wacquant, 1996, 126).
Actually this phenomenon goes hand in hand with the “loss of hinterland”,
that is, the erosion of kin, friend, and group support of the neighborhood (Wacquant,
1996, 127). The decreasing solidarity in the neighborhood is a result of the economic
condition of the neighborhood as a whole, since the residents of abandoned quarters
lack economic resources and so the means of “collective sustenance” as a result of
deproletarization and / or underemployment processes of the Post-Fordist economy.
In addition, the ideological dominance of individualism may contribute to the
declining solidarity. To sum up, one can infer that the excluded labor has nowhere to
turn to, that is, only if s/he wants to.
The consequence of these two processes is the further fragmentation of the
unprivileged group or groups in the social domain in addition to their fragmentation /
atomization in the economic domain. This also leads to fragmentation in ideational
domain due to the loss of the “shared representations and signs through which to
conceive a collective destiny and to project possible alternative futures” (Wacquant,
1996, 128).
1.4 Changing Social Structure in Contemporary Western Metropolises
From the above arguments, it can be inferred that Western metropolises since the
mid-1970’s have been facing radical social and spatial changes. The economic
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transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism is the most debated and influential process
behind this process, which influenced both the social structure and the spatial
organization of western metropolises. The general trend can be generalized as social
disintegration with the widening gap between social classes. Today, the existence of
extreme poverty and extreme wealth jointly is becoming a usual aspect of Western
metropolises. However, this joint existence turns to be a questionable argument if we
examine the situation carefully.
It is true that these two extremes exist together in a single social space,
namely, the metropolis. However, in contemporary world, the real physical distances
and boundaries increasingly losing their importance. Recent developments show that,
while distances of thousand kilometers can be accessed in seconds, as in the case of
Internet and other telecommunication technologies, it would be impossible to
transcend few meters. Actually, it is the latter situation, that is, the impossibility of
passing the “inner borders” within a “single” space that is on the agenda in world
metropolises. Marcuse’s (1996; 1997) statements about the construction of symbolic
and actual walls are the declarations of this situation. In this sense, rather than joint
existence, disintegration of the social fabric is a more realistic statement about the
situation in Western metropolises.
Certainly, disintegration of the social fabric has important consequences.
Among these, the loss of public space and socio-spatial dissociation requires further
elaboration. As shown above, the loss of public space and socio-spatial dissociation
further strengthens the dissociation of social structure, which results in further
marginalization and exclusion of lower classes. Actually, it is this process that brings
about a huge literature on “underclass” in the Western social science literature. On
the contrary, when we examine the Turkish social sciences literature, the formation
35
of an “underclass” is only recently becoming a topic of  interest. It is clear that this is
due to different line of social development of Turkish society, which until recently
could be able to prevent the formation of an “underclass”, rather than the
indifference of social scientists of Turkey to the social developments of their society.
However, as the increase in the number of studies concerning poverty and urban
problems indicates, social structure of Turkey and its metropolises is in a process of
change. As a result, it is required to examine the recent developments in Turkish
metropolises with a historical perspective in order to gain insight into contemporary
developments. In the following chapter, historical course of the rural-to-urban
migration in Turkey, migrants’ social position in metropolises, and the survival
means of large sections of these people, who turned into urban poor after migration
process, namely the informal networks of the poor, will be explored. In Chapter III,
by the help of the observations made in Chapter II, recent developments in Turkish
metropolises will be analyzed.
36
CHAPTER II
COMMUNITARIAN INFORMAL NETWORKS IN TURKISH
METROPOLISES: THE APPARATUS OF THE POOR TO INTEGRATE
INTO URBAN SOCIETY
In the previous chapter, theoretical framework of the space and society relationship
was discussed. By the help of this theoretical framework and the literature on
Western society and metropolis, the effects of economic restructuring on society and
city space, and the social consequences of the newly emerging city space were
explored. It was shown that social disintegration and spatial fragmentation go hand in
hand, that is to say, mutually feeding each other. Although the main cause of the
recent social fragmentation and dissociation appears to be the Post-Fordist labor
process and social regulations, it is the city space that is directly influenced by and,
in turn, accelerates this process.
The walling processes in the Western metropolises served for the “hygiene”
of the upper classes that left behind all the ‘dirt’ in the abandoned neighborhoods.
The hygiene and control against the poor that was mainly achieved by stigmatization
and territorial labeling resulted in the marginalization of the poor in economic,
social, ideational, and political domains. Moreover, territorial alienation and the loss
of hinterland among the poor eroded the means of solidarity, that is, a process which
resulted in atomization of the individual poor in his / her survival struggle. As a
result, marginalization, exclusion and the formation of an “underclass” became one
of the “real” aspects of life in Western metropolis.
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The below schema illustrates the process of social disintegration,
marginalization, exclusion, and formation of an “underclass” in the Western city with
reference to spatial dimensions.
 Economic economic marginality
Ideational 2 practices on space  city space ideational irritation         + inner fragmentation of the poor
Social social discrimination
Political  political marginality
Domains of social structure                                                            consequences of the new city                consequences of the
space at the group level                        new city space at
                          individual level
(Inter-group domain)                           (Inner-group domain)
Figure 2-1) The illustration of the process of marginalization, exclusion and the
formation of an “underclass” in the Western metropolises with respect to space.
In Turkey, the situation is significantly different from the Western case. As
argued in the last section of Chapter 1, the formation of an “underclass” is only
recently on the agenda in Turkish metropolises. However, it would be a wrong
interpretation to equate the formation of an “underclass” with marginality and / or
exclusion and to argue that marginality and exclusion are also recent phenomena in
Turkey. On the contrary, since the start of rural-to-urban migration, marginality and
                                                
2 The term “ideational domain” in this study refers to the cultural, symbolic and perceptual aspects of
the social structure. It is evident that these aspects reqires deeper and separate evaluation. However, in
this study due to the focus and the limits of the study, the researcher chose to evaluate this aspects
under a common name.
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exclusion have been significant features of Turkish metropolises for both migrants
and their social spaces, namely the informal neighborhoods. Strikingly, it is due to
this fact that Turkish metropolises have been free from an “underclass” until
recently.
The case of Western metropolises shows that, as a result of the Fordist
Keynesian Welfare State’s policies and regulations, the potential poor of the Post-
Fordist Schumpeterian Workfare State did not need and intent to develop survival
strategies that was independent from the states’ welfare provisions. Consequently,
when welfarism as a regulation model was left, the sections of the society, which
were dependent on welfare provisions, turned into marginalized and excluded groups
that became the basses of the Western ‘underclass’. On the contrary, the Turkish
poor had already been equipped with communitarian survival strategies before the
start of migration to cities (see Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000). Migrants, who turned
into the urban poor living in the peripheries of the metropolises, adapted these
communitarian survival strategies to city life. Consequently, by the help of these
strategies, some sections of migrants were able not only to survive in the city, but
also to actualize upward mobility. However, it must be remembered that the ability to
survive and relative well-being does not mean “full” integration into the wider
society. On the contrary, these groups and their residences as social entities could
have not overcome the stigmas, discriminatory discourses, and practices towards
themselves since the 1950’s.
Regarding these, in this chapter, the survival strategies and tools of the urban
poor, that is, their communitarian informal networks (CIN) in Turkish metropolises,
will be explored. This will enable us to comprehend the social structure of the
marginalized, excluded, and disadvantaged urban poor in Turkish metropolises. To
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do this, firstly, general features of migration in Third World countries and Turkey
will be analyzed.
2.1 Migration in the Third World and Turkey
One of the common features of Third World urbanization is the association of this
process with rural-to-urban migration, independent, and usually in the absence, of
industrialization. In this respect, third world urbanization is mostly mediated by push
forces rather than pull forces3. Two main factors behind this type of migration can be
stated, namely, the Malthusian pressure as a result of population growth and the
economic conditions that are generated by external forces (Parnwell, 1993, 147).
Also evacuations due to various projects, such as infrastructural projects for national
and strategic interests (Lighford, 1978, in Parnwell, 1993) or conflictual situations,
like national or civil wars (Keleş, 1982, 59), may become the triggering factors of
migration.
The urbanization of Turkey is not exceptional from the general Third World
frame. The formation of “informal neighborhoods” (gecekondu)4 in Turkish
metropolises, that is, the residences of migrants, was also triggered by similar factors
of migration. It is the 1950’s that informal neighborhoods turned to be a significant
issue for Turkish society, and continued its importance from then on.
                                                
3 Pull forces are the features of the cities that attract migrants. The opportunities oferred by the cities
in finding better jobs , accesing to better education, health and other social provisions etc. are some
important factors that activate the pull factors. On the contray, push forces are the changing social,
economic and political features of the place of origin, which are disadvantegous for the groups or
individuals, who turned into migrants (Keleş, 1990).
4 In this study, the term “informal neighborhood” is prefered to be used rather than the term
“gecekondu”, since the term “gecekondu” does not define the residences of migrants adequately,
especialy after the post-1980 transformations.
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2.1.1 The First Wave of Migration
The emergence of the “informal neighborhood problem” in the newspapers of the
Turkish media dates back to 1947 (Şenyapılı, 1998, 302). Yet, it is the 1950’s that
mass migration from countryside to metropolises became an important issue in the
society. In order to comprehend the migration in Turkey, it is necessary to consider
the Marshall Aid Plan, which is commonly accepted as one of the main triggering
factors of migration.
The Marshall Aid Plan was a project to modernize the agricultural sector.
However, this modernization effort resulted in unemployment in the countryside for
those peasants without land, who used to be employed as agricultural workers. In
addition to this, for the ones who own agricultural land, the continuous shrinkage of
arable fields as a result of sharing between the off springs by inheritance left
insufficient amount of land for families to produce sufficient amounts of surplus
(Gürel, 2001, 134). The combination of these two factors resulted in a significant
number of rural population that had no chance to survive unless migrated to cities.
Actually, it is this group that forms the basis of the informal neighborhood
population in metropolises, which later on became one of the major concerns of the
society.
2.1.2 The 1950-1960 Period
The developments mentioned above led pioneers to migrate to large cities of Turkey,
mainly Istanbul and Ankara (Gürel, 2001,135). The major characteristics of this
migration process can be said to be the absence of state / formal organizations’
interventions in the process, and planning or sponsorship. In such a condition,
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migrants shaped their own future with their limited economic, social and cultural
capital, without any formal help.
Under these conditions, migrants built their shanties near industrial sites at
the peripheries of the city in Istanbul, and close to center in the absence of organized
or small industrial sites in Ankara (Şenyapılı, 1998, 302,303). Şenyapılı (1998, 302)
states that the industrialists in Istanbul of the time covertly supported the
construction of shanties near industrial sites, since this meant lower wages to re-
produce the workforce.
The behavioral pattern of these first generation migrants was shy and timid
since they were anxious about the security forces because of their awareness of the
illegal act they were doing, namely, the construction of illegal shanties. In addition to
material causes, this psychological state can be said to be another factor contributed
to the construction of the shanties at the peripheries hidden from the public eyes.
These altogether created an alienated / stranger migrant typology in the metropolis
(Gürel, 2001,135).
Furthermore, the attitude of the established urbanites was exclusionary and
discriminatory towards migrants. Urbanites’ exclusion of migrants was mainly due to
cultural reasons. In the eyes of the urbanites, the migrant was wild and uncivilized
(Gürel, 2001, 135). In this sense, the migrant was a threat to the urbanite’s “modern”
values and life-style (Erman, 2001).
Not only the established urbanites but also the political authority felt
threatened. Şengül (2001, 78) states that:
Particularly, the dual structures appearing in the large cities were
turning into conflict, on the one hand between the state and the
gecekondu population due to disregarding the private ownership
and planning rules, and on the other hand, between the latter group
and the established middle classes.
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So in addition to cultural ones, there were also political aspects of
discrimination aroused from perceived or real threats against the norms and laws
based on private property rights. Although middle classes were still holding the
economic power of urban land as rant, their political and cultural project was
impeded (Şengül, 2001, 78).
2.1.3 The 1960-1970 Period
By the 1960’s, a new attitude towards migrants started to emerge. In spite of
continuation of some negative attitudes and practices towards migrants, such as some
demolitions of informal neighborhoods, it can be argued that the general attitude of
the state towards the informal neighborhood population became relatively positive.
There are identifiable reasons behind this development. Firstly, it can be said that
informal neighborhoods started to be seen as an inescapable fact. Secondly, in this
time period, migrants, to a considerable extent, were able to overcome their alien
mode towards the city and to adapt to this new environment. These people began to
be employed in state institutions and informal or marginal sector, usually as unskilled
labor in various branches or as street venders and so on. Also, the changing political
balance had important effects on this attitude change: the competition of political
parties forced them to consider migrants as an important voting potential since this
group was becoming an important political target due to its growing size in number
(Şengül, 2001, 80-81). In addition to this, Gürel (2001,136) points to the increasing
political consciousness of the residents of informal neighborhoods. Although this
argument is controversial, it is true that these people were starting to learn how to
make use of clientele and party patronage relations for self-interests, which can be
regarded as a sign of adaptation to urban way of life. Şengül (200,81) states that
43
Kemalist project and its representative in the political domain, namely, the
Republican People’s Party (RPP), which was previously unsuccessful in its effort to
be integrated into the society, inclined into a left position by identifying its target
population as the urban poor. This also contributed to the tolerant political attitude
towards the informal neighborhoods of migrants. Lastly, the increasing hegemony of
the Marxist ideology on the public sphere by the end of the 1960’s became an
important factor for the increasing sympathy towards the poor (Erman, 2001, 986).
In addition to political factors, the economic policies of this period, namely,
the import substitution model had significant effects on the relative well-being of the
urban poor. Basically, import substitution model aims to achieve economic
development by closing and protecting itself against competition in the global
market. This strategy necessarily needs a dynamic internal market in order to
continue production and economic growth, which makes it dependent on internal
consumption and labor. As a result, beginning from the 1960’s the urban poor turned
to be an important component of consumers as well as cheap labor. The political elite
of the Turkish Republic, for this very economic reason, in addition to political ones,
tolerated the residents of informal neighborhoods (Erman, 2001, 986; Şengül, 2001,
81).
Although these political and economic developments point to a relatively
favorable picture for the urban poor, there was still spatial, economic and cultural
duality in the city, which was disadvantageous for the poor groups. These people
were still far from being urbanized citizens for socio-spatial reasons (Şengül, 2001,
82). The political polarization in the society (Gürel, 2001,136) and the continuing
dominance of modernist ideology (Erman, 2001) were the other reasons that
obstructed the integration of informal neighborhoods into urban society. In sum, it
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can be claimed that, in the 1960’s the metropolis was a relatively favorable but still
exclusionary environment for the poor.
2.1.4 The 1970-1980 Period
The 1970’s were chaotic years due to political polarization of the society between
left wing and right-wing ideologies and organizations. Although the main actors of
this polarized politics were university students and intellectuals, the antagonist
political atmosphere was also dominating large segments of the society. The urban
poor were not free of this situation. Rather informal neighborhoods were at the core
of political struggles and street fighting. The urban left approach of RPP and the
sympathetic view of Marxists towards informal neighborhoods resulted in an alliance
formed between the left and the residents of these quarters. Especially the second-
generation, young urban poor were usually the activists of radical left-wing
organizations, while the first generation was mostly conventionalist, in the political
line of RPP (Şengül, 2001, 85).
Erman (2001, 986) argues that, in this period urban rant from informal
neighborhood quarters, that is, “the making of easy money out of gecekondu
settlements” was tolerated by the governing political parties, who probably saw it as
a means of ‘bribing’ the informal neighborhood population in order to keep them
from political activism against the state”. The continuing migration and the land
scarcity to build shelter, as well as the post-1980 gecekondu amnesties were
triggering the transformation of informal neighborhood’s use value to exchange
value. This was a turning point for the evolution of ‘informal settlements’.
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2.1.5 The 1980- Early 1990 Period
The date of 1980 is a turning point in Turkish history, in which almost all domains of
societal life were influenced by structural changes. Among these, the changes in
economy are of considerable importance. Briefly, by that time, while economy
policies favoring integration into the world capitalist system started to be actualized,
Turkey faced an ongoing inner disintegration from then on (Gürel, 2001, 137).
At the urban level, Şengül (2001, 87-88) defines these developments as the
end of the process of urbanization of the workforce and the beginning of the
powerful penetration of the capital into urban area. Capital dominated the social
balance for its own advantage by hegemonizing the previously restricted areas in the
absence of any political opposition. The hegemony of the logic of market economy
had / has very important results for the city space and its population in general, and
for the informal neighborhoods and their population in particular. Among those,
increasing emphasis on the exchange value of informal neighborhoods needs further
elaboration.
Actually, there were conscious efforts by the Motherland Party, which was
holding political power in the 1980’s, to emphasize the exchange value. So in this
new era of Turkish history, society faced a shift in the meaning and perception of
informal neighborhoods from their use value marked by urban leftism in the 1970’s
to exchange value (Şengül, 2001,90). This process was reinforced by the gecekondu
amnesties of 1984 and 1985 that allowed the construction of up to four-storey
buildings on gecekondu estates. It has to be noted that, in addition to the hegemony
of the market economy, the political bribing of the government of the time to silence
the potential victims of new economic policies is an important factor for these
promotions (Erman, 2001, 987; Şenyapılı, 1998).
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These developments brought about differentiation in the informal
neighborhood population: while some residents of informal neighborhoods
experienced an increased deprivation as the result of new liberal economy policies,
some of them became economically better off by benefiting from urban rants
(Erman, 2001, 987). In addition to this, by the arrival of the South Eastern migrants
to Metropolises, this process intensified5. The renting of houses to new migrants and
more importantly, selling of the land to building contractors in return for apartments
in the newly constructed building (Erman, 2001, 993) was the way for economic
improvement for advantageous dwellers, who were the ones that came to
metropolises relatively long time ago and possessed enough amount of urban land
and that had clientelist political networks and held political power in the district by
their social networks or personal charisma.
2.2 The Impossibility of Full Integration of Migrants: “Permanent Otherness”
The history of migrants, that is, the urban poor, can be briefly claimed to be the
history of struggle to “gain a place” in the urban society (see Erder 1997). However,
this goal has never been fully actualized. Migrants and their social spaces have
always been a disintegrated, antagonist or at least agonist part of the city and city
life. In sum, Turkish metropolises have had always “Others” in them.“ Permanent
Otherness” is an appropriate term to define this situation.
                                                
5 The migration from southeast Turkey to metropolises can be labeled as involuntary mass migration.
Due to the characteristics of this type of migration and other factors, such as the conflict and clashes
in the place of origin of the migrants, this group of post-1980s migrants turned into the most
disadvantaged migrant group in the history of internal migration in Turkey. Consequently, it is well
grounded to expect and observe the effects of southeastern migration to  metropolises in production
and strengthening of differention among the residents of the informal neighborhoods.
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As early as 1948, there appeared complaints about the informal
neighborhoods that were said to be terrifying and disgusting. In 1949 a reaction by a
well-known journalist towards those neighborhoods was as follows:
Governor (F.K. Gokay) has taken the gecekondu population under
his protection. I have no objection. But, we should not be surprised
if the gecekondus that have their own law, order, and cabinet today,
have control over the security forces, and even over the army
tomorrow (Toker, 1949, cited in Şenyapılı, 1998, 308).
Of course, this is an exaggerated version of the complaints. However, it
shows us the existence of discomfort and anxiety towards informal neighborhoods, at
least in some portions of the society.
In addition to this sort of complains, there were also modest reactions. In the
1950’s and 1960’s, by the influence of the modernist ideology of the urban middle
classes, the residents of informal neighborhoods were blamed for their unwillingness
to abandon their rural values and life styles. Informal neighborhoods and their
residents were the “non-modern Other”, which were obstacles to modernization. In
other words, they were the “non-urban, rural Other” (Erman, 2001, 990).
Şenyapılı (1982, cited in Erman, 2001, 991-993) claims that in the 1970’s and
early 1980’s, the residents of informal neighborhoods were still viewed as culturally
inferior by the established urbanites. Despite the continuity of cultural exclusion, in
this period some scholars started to emphasize structural barriers against gecekondu
people’s integration into the wider society. The unavailability of jobs and inadequate
public policies were the mostly emphasized structural obstacles (Erman, 2001, 992).
However, these scholarly defenses of informal neighborhoods could not change the
perceptions of the urbanites (Erman, 2001).
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Another important dimension of the exclusion of the residents of informal
neighborhoods can be analyzed by considering the radical-politics of the 1970’s. As
it was argued above, in those years, informal neighborhoods turned to be quarters
from where radical groups were gaining activists. In this sense it is well grounded
that these districts would have been blamed and excluded for posing political threats,
especially against the upper classes. So another dimension of Otherness can be
named as “political Otherness”, at least in the minds of some portions of the society.
By the date 1980, in addition to the disintegration process that took place in
Turkish society as a whole, fragmentation and disintegration also showed itself in
informal neighborhoods. Before the 1980’s, the residents of informal neighborhoods
were used to be perceived as forming a homogenous group. Certainly, this may well
be a result of the dominant ideology / paradigm of the related time period. However,
there was solid ground, up to a certain extent, that confirms this totalistic view. In
short, the “other” of pre-1980, by the onset of the 1980’s was fragmented into several
“others”. The emergence of “multiple others” can be followed by analyzing two
domains, namely, the economic domain and the ideational domain.
As a result of the process discussed above, while some gecekondu dwellers
turned to be better off economically, the remaining group became poorer. On the one
hand, there appeared a group of post-residents of informal neighborhoods who were
the “undeserving rich other”, and on the other hand, the remaining group turned to be
the “urban poor other” (Erman, 2001). In addition to these, the dominance of the
modernist ideology of the Turkish upper classes and elite maintained the “culturally
inferior Otherness” for both groups.
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2.3 Understanding Informal Neighborhoods in Turkey: The Inescapable
Territorial Labels
In the physical sense, informal neighborhoods in Turkey can be defined as a type of
residential settlement, which are formed illegally with poor infrastructure at the real
(and symbolic) peripheries of the city. However, as mentioned in the first chapter, a
space is never neutral but social. The characteristics of the space is a result of the
general conduct of the society. Thus, physical qualities are only partial descriptions
of any space, and in our case, informal neighborhoods. So, the exploration of social
conditions in which the informal space is formed, is needed. The result of the
analysis shows that the informal neighborhood has always been an “other space”
with its own meaning and identity, which is an integral part of the identity of its
population. As argued above, “otherness” is the most significant aspect of this
identity. In this sense, despite the important sociological differences between the
American ghetto, European banlieue and Turkish gecekondu, there is important
parallelism between these settlements in symbolic means. The “confession” of a
young informal neighborhood resident clearly shows the negative symbolic meaning
of informal neighborhoods.
I live in a gecekondu settlement. So our house is a gecekondu … I
hate that through my life I felt shame because of this. This turned
into my only secret to hide in university, in my job, and in my
relationships. I always wanted to hear that someone else also
resides in a gecekondu house. But this never happened. The words
resembling building like up-floor, down-floor always hurt me. I
always said if only. I think if only I could be able to start a sentence
with “the son of our next door”. I am at this age but I still think the
same things. I feel the strongest shame whenever I need to write or
tell my address. How bad, isn’t it? I feel shame (itiraf.com, cited in
Erdoğan, 2001).    
Actually the reason behind large number of studies on informal
neighborhoods in Turkish social science literature can only become meaningful if
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one considers this covert reality. Otherwise, only explanation of this large literature
can be the attractiveness of physical entities for Turkish scholars or just their habit to
study these neighborhoods.
Regarding these it can be claimed that similar results of socio-spatial
disintegration in Western metropolises must exist in Turkish metropolises. However,
at the expense of repeating myself, it must be said that results are considerably
different: in Turkey territorial stigma and labeling resulted in further strengthening of
marginalization and exclusion but did not contribute to the formation of an
“underclass”. It can be said that the communitarian informal networks (CIN) of the
“others”, other than formal ones, formed in the “other” spaces were the apparatus
that prevented the urban poor from becoming an  “underclass”.
2.4 Informal Networks in the Turkish Case
The existence of informal networks is not unique to Turkish metropolises. Indeed,
there is a worldwide phenomenon of informal networks. However, their causes
(Roberts, 1994, 7), and relative strength and importance differ due to specificities of
different regions. Roberts (1994) categorizes the causes specific to regions as
follows: in developing countries “economic survival during rapid urbanization”, in
the USA “economic adjustment of immigrant groups”, in Britain “decline in formal
employment opportunities and in welfare state”, and in Italy “new and dynamic
models of economic growth”. In spite of the differences in the causes, there are
shared characteristics explained by different scholars. Firstly, the weakness of
bureaucratic structures, which make and carry out the social policies of the state,
especially in the area of job opportunities and distribution of wealth, is a major
determinant of the formation of informal networks. Secondly, informal networks
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cannot be defined as “clearly bounded set of activities”, that is to say, there is a
fusion of legal and illegal activities that makes it impossible to make essential
judgements regarding their legal status. In fact, at least in some cases, formal and
informal activities interact. The role of informal economy in capital accumulation for
the formal economy is a widely known and relevant phenomenon to Turkish setting
that constitutes an example to this relationship. Thirdly, the members of the networks
are not passive. On the contrary they are active actors. In other words, as Işık and
Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) put it, they are the actors having  “transforming capacity”.
Fourthly, these networks are not traditional in their practice, although their roots may
be traced to rural way of life (see for instance, Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001a).
Finally, related to the fourth characteristics, personal relations, such as kinship,
friendship and co-ethnicity, are the grounds that networks rise.
One more aspect to be considered in order to comprehend the issue is the
difference between the short-term and the long-term goals of the networks. While the
short-term goals can be defined as defensive purposes that reflect the values and
means of the local community, the long-term goals can be defined as social mobility
strategies (Roberts, 1994, 11). By using this framework, the long-term survival of
informal networks becomes comprehensible. The functionality of the networks, in
addition to “secular trends” that provide ground for their survival, are the
determinants of their existence.
The “permanent Otherness” of the informal neighborhood residents points to
the inability of their full integration into the wider urban society. If one considers the
Durkhemian notion of organic solidarity in modern society, this would point to an
obstacle against the survival of the informal neighborhood population, since organic
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solidarity points to the necessity of mutual dependency for the members of the
society.
For a brief explanation, it should be argued that the lack of organic solidarity
with the wider urban society is replaced by the communitarian informal networks
(CIN) of the informal neighborhood residents, which lies at the heart of the “Turkish
model of welfare” (TMW).
Self-responsibility to satisfy social needs and to formulate strategies for this
purpose is the main aspect of TMW. Erder (1998) explains the basis of the TMW as
the transfer of the social solidarity issues solely to the domain of traditional family /
relative relations. This resulted in a new pattern of relationship that provides welfare
independent from the regulation of the state. In fact, this model was preferable for
the state since TMW relieved the burden of the state by providing solutions to the
problems of migrants. By this way, the state freed itself from providing social
promotions to its citizens.
In order to be successful in this process, primordial ties of “family / kin
networks of economic and social solidarity” are used in the absence of state
intervention (Kalaycıoğlu & Tılıç, 2000, 526). Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2000, 526)
argue that “the state had no policies for providing housing. The state institutions
functioned as if there were no housing problem ... Due to lack of resources, the
Turkish welfare state was able to provide only limited social benefits, and the
demand was too great to be easily met”. Actually, it was not only the housing
problem that was to be solved. In addition to shelter, “regular income” and “better
share in health and educational opportunities” were also among the main problems.
These problems of the migrant population were solved by the migrants themselves
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by developing their own strategies based on primordial relations that, then, turned
into CIN.
In fact, these strategies and networks are the extensions of the rural life
(Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000). In this sense they were not brand new organizations,
rather they were applications of rural networks to the new setting, that is, the
metropolis. Sjoberg’s (cited in Aslanoğlu, 1998, 36-38) evolutionary exposition of
the transformation of social structures from pre-industrial to industrial may be
fruitful to comprehend the process of reshaping of the primordial networks or their
continuing existence in the urban setting. His linear developmental process is as
follows (cited in Aslanoğlu, 1998, 38):
i) Resistance and strive of some of the traditional forms to
survive
ii) Transformation of traditional forms after scrutinization
iii) Disappearance of traditional forms
iv) Replacement of the disappeared forms and institutions by
new ones
Sjoberg also proposes that there are some forms of adaptation mechanisms.
By the help of these mechanisms, the migrant adapts to the new urban way of life. In
this process, the family and the kin have roles in the “education” of the migrant, by
means of which he / she learns how to behave and formulate strategies to cope with
urban difficulties. By this mechanism, the ties with the countryside continue.
If we regard social forms as parts of the adaptation mechanisms, we can infer
that evolution of social forms from traditional to modern must be parallel with their
functionality. When better social forms to adapt to urban life come into agenda, the
previous ones leave their place to these new ones.
When we apply this model to the Turkish case, the continuity of non-modern
ties in the form of CIN becomes understandable. Firstly, as was said above, the lack
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of sufficient state provisions to support new migrants in order to fulfill their social
needs has forced migrants to transfer rural-based strategies to the urban setting. The
character of the migration process constitutes the second reason. Since the migration
in the Turkish case was due to push factors, in other words, it was a migration not
accompanied by industrialization, there was no ground for migrants to create or join
modern social organizations, such as labor unions or associations. These two factors
lie behind the lack of evolution of social forms into modern ones in the Turkish case,
which Sjoberg suggests.
In fact, there is another factor that contributes to the continuity of primordial
ties. This is about the type of migration. Erder (1995) claims that it is possible to
categorize the types of migration into three, namely, 1) individual-rational migration,
2) mass migration, and 3) chain migration. Individual-rational type migration is, in
general, irrelevant to our study, since it usually takes place among the middle and
upper class individuals in order to upgrade their living conditions that are already
above a certain level. In this sense, individual-rational migration is a result of a
rational calculation process. The emigration of professionals for better salaries and
occupational opportunities, and the “student emigration” to Western universities for
better educational opportunities are the two common examples of this kind of
migration.
The particularity of mass migration is that, at the end of migration there
remains very little or no ties with the region of origin of migrants. This is a result of a
migration process that is not in echelon. That is to say, migration process covers
almost whole population of the region and occurs in a very short time period. There
may be social, economic or political reasons behind this type of migration. It shows
similarities with forced migration but not always involves force.
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In chain migration, decision to migrate is not made by the individual. Rather,
it is a collective decision. The migrant, usually a young man, migrates to the city as a
pioneer, and then the other members of the family follow him. The previously
migrated pioneer-migrant provides information and support for the ones, who follow
him to the city. Also the pioneer is by no means rootless since he has relatives, who
support him materially and psychologically, in the region of origin. Rural ties also
function as safety belts for the ones who could not succeed in metropolises, since
these ties give the opportunity to turn back. Actually, this network can be extended to
the whole village or province. In the Turkish case, especially in the pre-1980 era, the
dominant type of migration can be said to be the chain migration.
The result of chain migration in the urban setting is the culturally
concentrated areas for migrants coming from the same region. Rural ties also
contribute to the maintenance of cultural homogeneity and continuity. The strong
fellow villagership (hemsehrilik) consciousness rises from these causes. Considering
the characteristics of chain migration, we can comprehend the cultural and economic
reasons that lie behind the lack of evolution of traditional structures to modern ones,
in addition to insufficient industrialization to absorb migrants and the indifferent
state response to migrants.
To sum up the argument of this section, we can talk about three reasons for
the lack of formation of modern social structures: 1) urbanization not accompanied
by industrialization and the non-existence of the prerequisites for modern social
networks to develop, such as labor unions; 2) the indifference of state institutions to
provide social provisions to migrants, leaving its responsibilities to non-state actors,
such as family and kin networks; and 3) by the help of chain migration, the relatively
easy and quick adaptation of primordial networks to urban matters, facilitated by
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cultural and economic solidarity. The fusion of these factors gave way to the
formation of strong “non-modern”, relatively closed and sometimes hostile networks
and communities, which I label as communitarian informal networks (CIN).
For the CIN in the Turkish setting, despite the wide consensus on the causes
and general characteristics of the networks, there are two camps of arguments that
differ with regard to their descriptions of the underlying mechanisms of the
networks. These camps can be classified as the advocates of the family and the
advocates of the hemsehri ties to be the basic unit of the networks.
2.4.1 The Perspective Suggesting the Family to be the Basic Unit of the
Communitarian Informal Networks (CIN)
Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2000; 2001), in addition to advocating the family to be the
basic unit of the CIN, formulated a model called “the family pool model”. Since,
according to this model, family lies at the core of the CIN, Turkish family structure is
of considerable importance. Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç define Turkish family structure as
follows:
Traditionally, families in Turkey are highly structured, with a dense
pattern of kin relations. The extended family is a major unit for the
socialization of the individual as well as for determining the
individual’s educational and occupational attainment. Although aiding
the development of the individual, this structure to some extent
restricts opportunities for the young to express their feelings and
opinions, especially within rural-based families. Although they may
disagree with the opinions and decisions of the older generation, they
cannot easily display this. Dense kinship relations and family loyalty
mean that open conflict between the generations is not tolerated, even
in the urban nuclear family (Kalycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000, 524-525).
It is clear from this quotation that family is one of most important
determinants of one’s life in Turkish society. Furthermore, family in Turkey may
turn to be a constraint against one’s own achievements. Although that is the case,
young generations do not / cannot free themselves from their families. While, on the
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one hand, cultural explanations can be put forward in order to explain this fact, on
the other hand, there is an important material cause for this dependency to the family,
that is, family’s functionality to provide support for the ones who obey its rules.
Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2000, 532) argue that family is a “crucial resource, a form of
capital, which provides them (the individual members) with a socio-economic frame
within which they can develop viable life-plans”. Family resources are important for
achieving one’s goals, which, in some cases, become instigators, and in some other
cases become inspirations. This fact lies at the core of family pooling.
In order for the resources to be redistributed among the family members,
there is the need for collective resources that are provided by the members of the
family to be accumulated by a “central organ”. Usually the head of the extended
family, that is, the father or the eldest son, plays the role of the central organ. Once
the central organ collects the resources, they are, in turn, redistributed to the
members of the family that are in need. Certainly, this distribution is not done
randomly. The member of the family to whom resources are to be allocated is chosen
by some criteria: the individual’s commitment to the family and his/her capability to
enhance the allocated resource. Thus, it can be argued that the family pool operates
like a corporate composed of various sub-companies. The head of the family
functions like the board of directors who decides or plans the investment policies and
the individual members of the family, like the sub-companies that depend on the
head of directors, fulfills their responsibilities to the head of the family, in return of
support and resources provided to them by the “center”. As Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç
(2001) argue, the branches of the family pool can spread from the region of origin to
foreign countries. At this point, it has to be noted that spatial proximity does not
matter, and that is a consequence of the “highly structured families of Turkey”:
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center may be in the Turkish metropolis or even in a foreign country (Kalaycıoğlu
and Tılıç, 2000).
To sum up the characteristics of the family pool system, two main points can
be put forward: 1) “the welfare-providing role of the family of origin is significant,
especially with migration”; unity and solidarity are actually defense mechanisms
against the worsening life conditions, and all members share and benefit from this
mechanism in different ways; and 2) there is little or no individual space or freedom
of choice for the members of the family benefiting from the network (Kalaycıoğlu
and Tılıç, 2000, 539-541).
As a result of these observations, functionally speaking, it can be argued that
the family pool serves both for the people and the state institutions by contributing,
in Buğra’s terms (2001, 23), to the social welfare regime of Turkey. On the other
hand, this kind of a social welfare regime further strengthens the already existing
fragmentations in the society based on primordial ties. As Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç put
it;
(M)utual aid greatly strengthens relations based on obligation and
reciprocity, binding members of the family to each other as a close-
knit group and excluding others: non-kin members of different
ethnic groups, and often their neighbors. Rather than creating inter-
generational cleavages in society, this generates a strong family
identity that is influenced and defined in large part by authority of
the older members (2000, 541).
Up to here the main operation principle of family pooling is discussed.
Although, according to Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, family pooling lies at the core of
social welfare regime of Turkey, there are also other networks and resources that
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KAMU
contribute to the social welfare of the urban poor. The below schema illustrates the
overall picture.
2.4.2 The Perspective Suggesting the Hemsehrilik to be the Basic Unit Of
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Figure 2-2) A model proposed for coping with poverty after the 1980’s in Turkey  (Kalaycıoğlu
and Tılıç, 2001).
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2.4.2 The Perspective Suggesting Hemsehrilik to be the Basic Unit of the
Communitarian Informal Networks (CIN)
The scholars that formulate their analysis on the hemsehri relationship especially
focus on the importance of cultural unity for its instrumentality in the formation of
hemsehrilik (see for instance Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 47).
In the formation of hemsehri networks, in addition to economic-functional
factors, there are normative and social-psychological factors. Normative factors,
which are also functional at the final analysis, are illustrated by Güneş-Ayata (1990-
1991, 91,101) by the example of the assistantship circle that expands from close
relatives to hemsehris for the construction of shelter. The help provided by relatives
and hemsehris in the construction of shelter is a symbolic sign of the willingness to
help, solidarity and sympathy. The social-psychological factor is the will and need or
preference to corporate with the groups that are most similar to the newcomer in the
foreign environment of the metropolis.
In the literature on hemsehri ties, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu’s study (2001a)
provides a satisfactory explanation of the principles of the operation of CIN based on
hemsehri ties as a mechanism. It has to be noted that it would be a wrong
interpretation to equate the mechanism, which Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) name as
“poverty in turns”, with hemsehri networks. In fact, “poverty in turns” is the name of
a general mechanism or way of operation, which usually rises on the basis of
hemsehrilik. Hemsehri networks serve for the “poverty in turns” mechanism by
providing a unifying element, that is, the culture that is the basis for the mechanism
to be lasting.
The mechanism of “poverty in turns”, according to Işık and Pınarcıoğlu
(2001a), is the “partnership” of migrants. This mechanism provides the early comers
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and the privileged groups the chance to get better off by benefiting from the new
comers. Actually, it is in this sense an unequal power relationship: the groups in the
mechanism do not benefit equally by the mechanism. In fact, this inequality is a must
in order for the mechanism to operate. This is not to say that this is a zero sum game
for new comers; they also benefit from the mechanism as this mechanism prevents
them from the “chaotic” order of the city and provides them means and hope to
achieve up-ward mobility by offering them opportunities in the job and housing
markets. This mechanism relies on four fundamental characteristics. These are as
follows:
“a) it is always based on the relations formed in the land and job
markets; b) it is usually supported by the relations with the business
sector, especially those built upon hemsehrilik; c) the unequal
distribution of the gains made in this sector to those who take part
in the system; and d) the political interests that are based upon
these unequal gains”(Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 40).
Actually, it is the changes in the job and housing markets that the formation
and continuation of the ‘poverty in turns’ depends. With the help of the clientelist-
patronage relationship, the owners of the gecekondu land and the house(s) take
advantage of these in order to provide economic and political profit by selling or
renting the land or the house(s) to the new comers. This is certainly related to the
transition of the gecekondu’s use-value to exchange-value, which reflects itself by
the increasing percentage of tenants and the decreasing size of the land on which the
houses are constructed (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a).
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2.5 Perspectives and Concluding Remarks on Communitarian Informal
Networks in Turkish Metropolises
Although family pooling and ‘poverty in turns’ are separate mechanisms, which are
argued to be the operating principles of the CIN, there is a wide consensus among the
scholars on the main characteristics, ontology and functions of the CIN.
As it was argued above, for the formation of the CIN, there are three main
factors that can be identified, namely, the state institutions’ disability to formulate
and apply social and economic policies in order to regulate the migration process or,
simply, their indifference to emerging problems aroused from migration, the absence
of sufficient level of industrialization in the metropolises to absorb the increasing
labor force that would engender modern organizations, such as labor unions and class
loyalty, and, lastly, chain migration that made the continuation of family, kin or
hemsehri ties possible. As a consequence of these, rural based primordial social ties
became the primary means of migrants for their economic and social survival, and
their psychological well being in the city. The functions of the networks can be put
as follows: 1) preservation / acquisition of identity in a “chaotic” environment
(Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991); 2) related to identity, the transfer of norms, values and
mores to young generations (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000); 3) provision of access to
material goods, like shelter and jobs. (Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991; Kalaycıoğlu and
Tılıç 2000; 2001); 4) social control (Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991); and 5) provision of
perceptual accessibility in order to make sense of the chaotic urban environment
(Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991).
It has to be note that these networks are also for the benefit of the state. By
the help of the networks among migrants and the poor, state excused itself from its
obligations to provide welfare to its citizens. Also, the social control inherent in these
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networks, most of the time prevented the poor from participating both in individual
criminality and anti-systemic political action.
These observations provide us the means to comprehend the reasons behind
the relative stability and order in Turkish metropolises. At first instance, it would be
claimed that, in the absence of any sufficient formal regulations, Turkish
metropolises would have faced with social disorder and unrest as a result of poverty,
discrimination and exclusion. Also, it would be easily predicted that formation of an
“underclass” in such a situation was a strong probability. But in reality this was not
the case. The networks, in both short and long terms, fulfilled their functions of
defense and meritocracy. In this respect, Turkish metropolises neither faced with
significant “deviant” and criminal activities nor contained an “underclass”, as in the
case of post- 1980’s Western metropolises. In brief, the situation in Turkish
metropolises can be defined as the impossibility of full integration in both societal
and spatial domains, but also as the absence of full exclusion and marginalization,
that is, a situation that can be labeled as a relative balance between the state, the
upper and middle classes and the poor.
Up to here, a general picture of the Turkish metropolises and networks of the
poor was given. It is now necessary to identify the changes in the networks in time. It
was claimed that the networks of the poor were primarily based on rural ties of
family and kin. However, by no means the rural ties are the same as the networks in
the metropolises. In fact, the networks of migrants are in a process of constant
change in response to the changing social context. In this sense, it can be claimed
that rural ties are transformed into the CIN with different operating principles than
the rural networks in the post-1980 period. Family pooling and the ‘poverty in turns’
are the two different explanations of the mechanism of the CIN. In brief, although
64
there is an important influential power of the rural ties in operation regarding the
CIN, these two are, indeed, different entities. In this sense, it would be a wrong
interpretation to claim that the CIN are traditional organizations. By the light of these
arguments, it is possible to come up with an important inference: The networks of the
poor are by no means constant or static. Rather they are in a constant process of
change in response to the social context. So, it is well grounded to expect a new
mode of operation of the networks with the changing context.
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CHAPTER III
SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POST-1980’S ISTANBUL
AND THE RISE OF URBAN ETHNICITY AND UNREST
In Chapter I, contemporary social and spatial developments in Western metropolises
were examined. The results of the analysis show that Western metropolises are
facing with a phenomenon, which can be labeled as social fragmentation and
disintegration. The main factor behind this proved to be economic transition, namely,
the transition from Fordist to Post-Fordist economy that has started by the mid’s of
the 1970’s. As a consequence of Post-Fordist labor process and social regulations,
class hierarchy in these societies strengthened and socio-economic polarization
between the rich and the poor went to extremes. These social developments also
reflected themselves on spatial patterns of Western metropolises. The quarters of the
rich and the poor crystallized, and this turned into a new aspect of the inequalities in
those societies. The crystallization of the quarters of the classes, in turn, strengthened
social fragmentation and disintegration by causing further economic, social,
ideational, and political marginalization. As a result, while on the one hand Western
metropolises witnessed the emergence of a class of extreme rich, on the other hand
faced with the rise of an “underclass”. In brief, Western metropolises,
contemporarily, experience a phase of polarization in both social and spatial
domains.
Although societies in different regions of the world experience different
developments, the general picture of the Third World metropolises show some
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parallelism to their Western counterparts. Social and spatial fragmentation and
disintegration in Third World metropolises are the major problems that must be
investigated in order to escape from their destructive consequences. In this chapter,
Istanbul, the largest metropolis and the only ‘global city’ in Turkey, will be
examined to comprehend the recent developments in spatial and social domains in
this city and their consequences. To do this, our analysis will regard the post-1980
military coup era as the turning point of Turkish society, since almost whole social
sciences literature on Turkey does so. The main emphasis will be on the
transformation of the networks of the poor in today’s Turkey. But before doing this,
changing social structure of Turkey, especially the metropolis of Istanbul will be
analyzed. Following the premises of the perspective on society and space
relationship that has proposed in Chapter I of the thesis, and by the light of
observations on the recent social structure of Istanbul, the spatial transformations in
this city will also be explored. This will enable us to make comparisons between the
Western “World Metropolises” and Istanbul in the conclusion chapter of the thesis.
After stating our insights on the newly emerging public space in Istanbul, by the light
of the relative deprivation and comparative reference group theories, the rise of
conflict among the poor in Istanbul will be analyzed. Lastly, the main emphasize of
this chapter, namely the transition of the communitarian informal networks of the
poor into conflictual ethnic and religious cleavages will be studied in order to
comprehend the recent developments in Metropolises of Turkey.
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3.1 The Recently Emerging Landscape of the Metropolis of Istanbul: From a
Patchwork-like City Space to Isolated Quarters
Social and spatial segregation has been one of the characteristics of cities, which is a
result of social differentiation and dissociation (Calderia, 1999, 87). However,
specific characteristics and the degree of social and spatial segregation matters, since
particular forms of segregation have particular consequences.
Recent developments in Istanbul indicate the increasing fragmentation of its
citizens into segments based on different expectations and life styles, and the
increasing problems of unemployment, housing, inequality and social justice (e.g.
Erkip, 2000). Not surprisingly, this newly emerging social structure reflects itself in a
new trend of urbanization in the city of Istanbul. The most visible and also extreme
vision of the fragmented and isolated city is seen in the division of formal and
informal settlements, occupied by diverse economic, cultural and social groups
(Köksal, 1993, cited in Erkip, 2000, 374). It can be argued that already existing walls
are being strengthening and new ones are being erected between the rich and the
poor and their residences. The most extreme, however not exceptional, appearance of
the walling in / walling out process can be followed by examining the formation of
‘gated communities’ / ‘fortified enclaves’ that are becoming usual elements of
Istanbul’s landscape. This in turn, strengthens social exclusion and creates the
perception of Otherness, which may foster social disorder. Recently, social tension(s)
due to this development are increasing in Istanbul (see, Güvenç and Işık, 2002;
Erkip, 2000; Aksoy and Robins, 1994) . State’s and local governments’ indifference
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to new socio-spatial developments further increases the possibility of the emergence
of destructive urban problems.
Calderia’s (1999) observations on the city of Sao Paulo constitute a good
example to comprehend the historical course of segregation in Istanbul due to the
similarities between these two metropolises. Calderia (1999) states that by the late
1940’s the city of Sao Paulo faced with a process of transition from a heterogeneous
landscape of dense and congested housing of different social groups to a segregated
landscape, fragmented in accordance with the differentiation of social classes. This
new fragmented landscape further intensified by the 1980’s and took a new form,
which can be labeled as isolation. This qualitatively new landscape is marked with
spatial closeness, but as a result of walling in / walling out practices and security
precautions, limited or no interaction between different social groups settled in
different neighborhoods exists. It would be fair to argue that these three phases of
urban landscape and organization of the city of Sao Paulo, namely, heterogeneity,
segregation, and isolation is similar to the “phases” of the city of Istanbul.
Aksoy and Robins (1994, 58) with reference to Leontidou (1993), state that
Istanbul historically resembles the general characteristics of Mediterranean cities.
Leontidou (1993) argues that Mediterranean cities are characterized by anti-planning
attitudes and patchwork-like city space. This argument points to the historical
heterogeneity of Mediterranean cities and so Istanbul with respect to social classes
and their residences. In spite of this historical characteristic, by the first half of the
19th century, Istanbul faced with conscious efforts in order to achieve “regularity”
and “order” (Çelik, 1986, cited in Aksoy and Robins 1994, 58). It is actually this
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effort to “rationalize the urban system” that segmented Istanbul, similar to the city of
Sao Paulo’s second phase of development. Aksoy and Robins (1994, 58) argue that
globalization is the bases of the next and necessary stage of rationalization and
modernization of the city, which brings the process of “rationalization” to its logical
extremes, namely isolation, as in the case of the third phase of city of Sao Paulo.   
Parallel to these arguments, Güvenç and Işık (2002) state that “Istanbul was
already a divided city in 1990”. But from this date up to now, this picture is
significantly changing as indicated above. The roots of this change can be traced
back to the early 1980’s. One of the most important developments of this period is
the worsened income distribution within the city.
The available data suggest that the gini coefficient, a measure of the
degree of inequality in income distribution, rose from 0.38 in 1978
tp 0.48 in 1987 and finally to 0.59 in 1994. Similarly, when
households are divided into ten income groups, the share in total
urban income of the wealthiest 10 per cent increased from 28.9 per
cent in 1978 to 39.2 in 1987 and to 52.0 per cent in 1994, with the
richest 1 per cent only receiving 29 per cent of all income in 1994.
Not only do gaps between different income groups seem to be
widened, but also the entire income structure of the city has
undergone a radical change. This is best evidence in drastic fall in
the share of wages and salaries in the total urban income: from 57.9
per cent in 1978 and to 32.9 per cent and to 23.6 per cent in 1994
(Güvenç and Işık, 2002,213-214).
Examining the newly emerging elite in Turkish society by the 1980’s would
help to comprehend this data and the observations made on Istanbul.
3.1.1 The New Post-1980’s Elite in Istanbul and the Fortified Enclaves
In the Özalist era following the 1980 military coup, the most radical changes took
place in the economic domain. Application of the principles of liberal economy, such
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as cancelling of constraints against importation and foreign bills, dramatically
changed the social structure of the society. Some portions of the Turkish bourgeoisie
gained large amounts of wealth by adapting their corporate structures to the new
requirements of the competititive liberal market. The most important change was the
replacement of managers, who were previously the members of the family that own
the corporate, by highly educated Turkish or foreign professionals. This new
professional group started to earn large amounts of money. Actually, it is this group
of professionals that make up the Turkish yuppies (young urban professional
individuals)6. Consequently, yuppies and the portions of Turkish bourgeoisie which
were mentioned above, became the cream de la cream of the society (Bali, 2002).
The emergence of unbalanced wealth7 was supported by the state. The
rationale behind this support was to increase consumption by creating a culture of
consumption in order to integrate Turkish economy into the global market. This may
also be considered as an effort to continue with the historical project of the Turkish
right, namely, “creating a millionaire in every quarter” and /or constructing “the little
America”8. Certainly, the changed political balance between the right and the left in
favor of the right in the post-military-coup period made it easier to apply such
economy policies in the absence of a leftist opposition.
                                                
6 The term yuppie defines the group of young professionals usually employed in the financial or
industrial sectors with very high salaries, who appeared in the 1980’s in the Reagan era in USA. An
important characteristic of this group is the desire for the highest quality services and products (Bali,
2002, 40-41).
7It was / is unbalanced because extreme wealth and poverty were / are arising at the same time.
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The appearance of the distinctive cultural characteristics of the new elite in
the public sphere did not take long. Consumption and popular western culture
became established in Turkish society in a relatively short time period. Actually the
new elite, especially the yuppies, had already been familiarized with western culture,
since most of them had completed their university education in foreign countries,
especially in the USA (Bali, 2002). Consequently, the new elite, in addition to some
politicians and high-level bureaucrats, constituted a new group of consumers having
high standards of “taste” and consumption, and also wealth that can afford it. The
choice of dressing, cultural and leisure activities, foods and drinks became one of the
major aspects of the identity of this group (see Bali, 2002). In this sense, ‘culture’,
once again became the distinguishing factor for being a member of the elite or the
common people (avam), although the underlying factor was the economic status, that
is, the income.
Due to increasing emphasis on culture, fragmentation among the rich
emerged. The new elite distanced themselves not only from the poor, but also from
the “undeserved rich” of post-informal neighborhood residents and Anatolian
bourgeoisie. A conflict between the ‘Anatolians’ and “original” citizens of Istanbul
emerged. The Anatolian bourgeoisie perceived to be culturally inferior like the post-
informal neighborhood residents, by the “original” citizens of Istanbul. The discourse
of maganda and kiro turned into a common stigma attached to ‘culturally inferior
Others’, both the rich and the poor. The new elite, on the contrary to the common
rich, was cultured, westernized, and intellectual with distinctive tastes. The popular
press also supported and promoted this new image of the new elite (Bali, 2002).
                                                                                                                                         
8 These historical slogans were brought forward by the officials of the Democrat Party (DP) that came
to power in 1950. DP can be regarded as the prototype and the premiss of the later center-right parties
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It did not take much time for the free market economy in the metropolises to
supply shopping malls, place of amusements, restaurants and clubs, centers of
cultural activities and so on to the new elite. The opening of Galleria in 1988 at
Ataköy and Akmerkez in 1993 at Ulus, various nightclubs and restaurants like
Şamdan, Safran and Ece Bar, which applied a concept of “friend-client” in order to
create an atmosphere of friendship and care are several examples of this
development. Certainly, in order to create such an atmosphere the doors of these new
places were / are closed to common people by erecting various kinds of “walls”, such
as security guards and words of warnings at the entrances of these places. In addition
to these, business quarters moved from the Karaköy-Eminönü-Sirkeci line to the
Salıpazarı-Kabataş-Fındıklı line, and then to the Mecidiyekoy-Gayrettepe-Esentepe
line and finally to the Zicirlikuyu-Levent-Maslak line. In this way, the employees in
Zincirlikuyu-Levent-Maslak line, who were mostly the new elite, were able to ride
their cars on the TEM highway, without moving into the city crowds and interacting
with the common people (Bali, 2002, 124-134).
It is clear that the new pattern of income distribution and the lifestyle of the
new elite points to an increasing fragmentation and isolation of social classes and
groups in both societal and spatial domains. As a before hand statement it can be
claimed that the most evident and clear form of fragmentation and isolation can be
followed by examining the new residences of the new elite (see Bartu, 2001; Danış,
2001).    
The increase in income levels of the new elite significantly influenced the
pattern of urbanization in Istanbul. In addition to the construction of new business
                                                                                                                                         
in Turkish political history.
73
centers, shopping malls, amusement centers and the like, the new residential sites of
the new elite are of considerable importance in the creation of this new pattern.
 The rich, who were previously located at the coastal side of Istanbul, started
to move to the newly-built sites surrounded by high security technologies and private
security agencies, having prices between 250 000 to 1 million USD, constructed by
big contraction companies “outside the built-up portion of the metropolitan area”
(Güvenç and Işık, 2002, 214). These new residences offer their residents a secure
environment, and most importantly a new way of life. The secure environment and
cultural “quality” of these sites are provided by strict selectivity by extreme ways,
such as the requirement to fill out questionnaires for new comers, in order to decide
whether they qualify for these residences. The self-sustainability, which is a
prerequisite for ‘security’, is provided by separate and private schools, sport centers,
health center, transportation facilities and so on. It has to be noted that while
selectivity, security and isolation act against the lower classes, elements of global
elite culture are welcomed (Aksoy and Robins, 1994; Güvenç and Işık, 2002). As
Güvenç and Işık (2002, 215) point out: “the result on the part of the nascent elite, is
an impermeable caste-like culture in which elements of the national culture are used
as an asset in the globalization game”.
Certainly, the formation of fortified enclaves was dependent on some
prerequisites. In addition to a certain level of socio-economic development, one of
the most important prerequisites was the re-regulation of the related code of laws.
This re-regulation was actualized by the 1984 housing law (Bali, 2002, 112). By this
date “the urbanization of capital” (Şengül, 2001) started, which became one of the
74
most important dynamics of the formation of fortified enclaves. Şengül (2001) states
that by the early 1980’s Turkish metropolises became increasingly hegemonized by
(big) capital. Big contraction companies, which were previously disinterested in this
market, started to involve in big housing projects. Indeed, for these companies
consideration and conformity to the legal regulations was not a considerable matter
having priority. Erkip (2000, 372) states that:
Previously, the housing demand of middle and upper income
groups was met by independent contractors who were small in
scale and weak in capital. Thanks to the state supporting large
corporations that have been trying to cope with decreasing profits
in manufacturing, housing investments turned out to be the most
profitable area of investment. Higher profit rates are sustained by
public land invaded by corporations, almost in same manner that
squatters did once. The only difference is in style of consent of the
state, which ignores the invasion in both cases, yet provides
infrastructure and other urban services more willingly this time.
After the land is sold to the firms at lower prices, municipal
authorities undertake the development of land. The newly emerging
conflicts of interest between squatters and large construction firms
forced the state to choose the side of the later (Buğra, 1998).
Although the dynamics of the formation of fortified enclaves in different
regions of the world (may) differ, examining the Western literature on issue is
fruitful to comprehend these dynamics, since they are more or less universal among
the global elite.
Bauman’s (2001, 57) statement of the escape of elite from community seems
to lie at the heart of social- psychological factors of the formation of fortified
enclaves.
More than anything else, the ‘bubble’ in which the new
cosmopolitan business and culture-industry global elite spends
most of their lives is –let me repeat- a community free zone. It is a
site where a togetherness understood as a sameness (or, more
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precisely, an insignificance of idiosyncrasies) of casually
encountered and ‘irrelevant on demand’ individuals – and an
individuality understood as a trouble-free facility with which
partnerships are entered and left – are daily practiced to exclusion
of all other socially shared practices. The ‘secession of the
successful’ is, first and foremost, escape from community
A more political economy explanation is also available in the same study.
Feature of community which prompts all those who can afford it to
opt out of it: an integral part of the idea of community is the
‘fraternal obligation’ ‘to share benefits among their members,
regardless of how talented or important they are’. This feature
alone makes ‘communalism’ ‘a philosophy of the weak’ ... ‘The
powerful and successful’ cannot easily dispose of the meritocratic
worldview without seriously affecting the social foundation of the
privilege which they cherish and have no intention of surrendering.
And as long as that worldview is upheld and made into canon of
public virtue, the communal principle cannot be accepted ... For the
‘powerful and successful’ the desire for ‘dignity, worth and honor’
paradoxically calls for the denial of community (Bauman, 2001,
58-59)
Although these arguments point out to the reasons behind the escape of the
elite from the community, in fact this group also needs community, but of different
kind than the “ideal” one. This community is the one composed of the “powerful and
successful”. This is so because like other people, the elite also find life precarious,
dissatisfying and even frightening in the absence of community. Despite the conflict
and clash between freedom and community, the absence of one or the other makes
life unsatisfactory. Furthermore, there is a perceived, and also a real, need for
belonging to a community in the recent “risk society” for safety, identity, and
material privileges. As a result, the elite form homogenous communities (Bauman,
2001).
It is a ‘community’ of the like-minded and the like-behaving; a
community of sameness –which, when projected on a wide screen
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of widely replicated / copied conduct, seems to endow the chosen
individual identity with the solid foundations the choosers would
not otherwise trust it to possess (Bauman, 2001, 64)
            In addition to this frame, in the literature, it is also possible to observe one
other dynamic behind the new elite’s tendency to form homogenous communities,
namely, security obsession, both in cultural and symbolic, and political aspects.
Aspiration to the ‘traditional neighborhood’, new “style” of life, and
integration into the global elite culture are the visible discourses legitimizing fortified
enclaves. The “sense of belonging” is a crucial aspect of these enclaves. The elite,
who consciously or non-consciously dissociate / disintegrate themselves from the
society of “others”, feel a need of belonging to a community, as Bauman suggests.
Actually, this community is supplied by the fortified enclaves perfectly. Since these
enclaves are intended to be highly homogenous, a community that is free from
“threats and others” becomes available9. The emphasis on the common public space
at the heart of the sites is a highly used advertisement discourse (see Bartu, 2001;
Danış, 2001). By this public space, the elite, who are alienated from the society by
choice, would overcome their alienation by interacting with other alienated elites. As
a result, the aspiration to traditional neighborhood is satisfied in these fortified
enclaves. In addition to this, cultural, artistic and sportive activities provided by the
sites fulfill the “requirements” in order to integrate with the global elite culture.
These two become the aspects of the new style of life. Although these are the cultural
and symbolic aspects of the dynamics of the formation of the fortified enclaves, it
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would be a partial explanation unless we analyze the political aspects, since they are
as important as the cultural and symbolic ones.
Beck (1999) identifies recent social life and structure by the term “risk
society”.
A life of risk –in which ‘the very idea of controllability, certainty
and security ... collapses’, and because at no other social location
has that certainty and security- and particularly the reassuring
feeling of ‘knowing for sure what is going to happen’ – collapsed
so spectacularly as in the underdefined, underinstitutionalized,
underregulated and all too often anomic territory of exterritoriality
inhabited by the new cosmopolitans (Beck, 1999,2, cited in
Bauman, 2001, 60).
Actually, risk society, which is uncertain, uncontrollable and insecure, leads
the elite to be obsessed with their security. More than anything else, it is the
“dangerous classes” of metropolis, composed of the ones who are at the lower strata
of the income distribution that constitute the bases of the metropolis dangers. This is
most obvious in the discourses and rhetoric that legitimize social isolation,
fragmentation and irritation, in sum the new mode of public space (Calderia, 1999).
Calderia (1999) argues that the elite in Sao Paulo expressed their views on chaos and
disorder in the city with the concepts, like contagious disease, nastiness and sexual
degeneration, and soon relate these with crime. In fact, statistical data provide
legitimacy to this rhetoric since crime rates as well as the rates of violence in
criminal activities started to increase by the 1980’s. This further strengthened by the
increased violence of the security forces toward those who are perceived / believed to
be criminal. So it is a security crisis that metropolises of the world are facing. Zukin
(1995, 38-39, cited in Bauman, 2001, 114-115) defines this situation by the terms
“watershed institutionalization of urban fear’ and “the politics of everyday fear”.
                                                                                                                                         
9 Although significant effort is spent in order to achieve homogenity, sometimes cracks arise on the
“filtering walls” of fortified enclaves, through which unwanted persons, who are “culturally inferior”
seeps in. Danış’s (2001) study provides emprical evidence to this fact.
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This makes the new elite withdraw from public spaces and turn inward to create their
own “public” life.
It looks increasingly likely that the missing comforts of a safe
existence need to be sought through other means. Safety, like other
aspects of human life in relentlessly individualized and privatized
world, must be a ’do-it-yourself’ job. ‘Defense of the place ‘, seen
as the necessary condition of all safety, must be a neighborhood
matter, a ‘communal affair’ ...  The members of the globe-trotting
elite… need a secure place of their own. Perhaps the other places,
other people’s places, do not matter- but that special place, their
own place does ... The community they seek stands for a burglar-
free and stranger-proof ‘safe environment’. ‘Community stands for
isolation, separation, protective walls and guarded gates ... What
looms therefore on the horizon of the long march towards ‘safe
community’, community as safety is a bizarre mutant of a
’voluntary ghetto’ (Bauman, 2001, 112-116).
3.1.2 New Mode of Public Space in Istanbul and Its Social Consequences
The new elite’s culture, in addition to integration with the world economy as the
result of increasing service sector at the expense of manufacture, strengthens the link
between the local and the global (Erkip, 2000). However the local consequences of
this process are highly questionable. Scholars like Nilüfer Göle, Ayşe Öncü and
Çağlar Keyder argue that new developments in Istanbul point to a formation of a
multi-cultural city. In other words, according to these scholars, a new
cosmopolitanism is on the agenda with short term and manageable negative
consequences (Aksoy and Robins, 1994). On the other side, scholars like Asu Aksoy
and Kevin Robins state that hostile identities and groups are emerging, new forms of
cleavages and segmentations are forming and the suppressed Istanbul is becoming
visible (Aksoy and Robins, 1994). It is clear that this picture is far from indicating a
harmonious society with only mild and manageable problems. If we evaluate the
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newly emerging situation with respect to social developments, Aksoy and Robins’
arguments appear to be a more realistic interpretation of the new public space. For
example Erdoğan (2001, 8) states that neo-liberal policies that are dominant in
Turkish politics since the 1980’s have produced new forms of social exclusion and
marginalization. In the Özalist era, increasing income polarization, declining social
welfare and security expenditures on the one hand, and on the other hand, the
“institutionalization” of “ostentation society”, the acceptance of social and class
hierarchies without question, increasing economic, cultural and symbolic violence
towards the poor, and the decline of egalitarian principles and cultural elements of
social justice, re-structured and re-produced the peripheral and minoriterian status of
the poor in distinct ways. The rhetoric of the “Other Turkey” can be viewed as an
expression of what Erdoğan states. In fact, any analysis of the rhetoric of
advertisement brochures of “fortified enclaves” and their residents (e.g. Aksoy and
Robins, 1994; Bartu, 2001; Danış, 2001) show clear evidence of the exclusion of the
“Other” and the will and conscious effort of isolation and walling, in order to create a
new style of life and a selected community and neighborhood (e.g. Bartu, 2001;
Danış, 2001). Danış’s (2001,160) interview with a resident of a fortified enclave,
namely, Bahçeşehir, strikingly illustrates this reality.
I think that Bahçeşehir, at least its current situation, must be
protected. Because Istanbul’s many disadvantages do not exist
here. It is for sure that these must be protected as much as possible.
(…) To do this residents must do something from below.
I am sure that, being a class A consumer, I think it must be
protected from the consumers of class B2. This must be said clearly
… While they were coming here people acted to prevent their
interests, their individual and class interests. Me too. Why do
people live in such a place where its walls are protected by
security? Because of this reason. To protect their individual, social,
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and also economic interests as long as it is possible. (…) I live in a
place of 20 000 population surrounded by walls in order to protect
myself in social means. No one should exaggerate this. It is for sure
that people reside here to protect and isolate their income levels
and class positions. (…) People came here by running away. This
statement is true also for the mafia leaders, also for me, also for the
people who started to work in a good company and gained wealth
in the age of 25, also for the famous textile industrialist, also for the
Çeçen mafia leaders, also for İbrahim Sadri. All of them are here
because they ran away.
Calderia (1999), in her study of Sao Paulo, states that this city as well as
many others in the world, face a decline of modern ideals, such as public use of the
public space10. Calderia (1999, 87) further argues that contemporary cities face a new
mode of public space that is characterized by homogenous enclaves, and distance
between the social groups who are perceived to be different and with whom less
communication is desirable. In this respect, new landscapes and social geography of
cities constitute the roots of this new regulation of public space.
By the light of above arguments, the general features of the newly emerging
public space can be analyzed. First and most visible outcome of the new regulations
in the city is the fragmentation of the social fabric and the isolation of social classes
from each other, both mentally and physically. In more concrete terms, what is on the
agenda is self-isolation and production of a closed but globally integrated culture for
the rich, and involuntary isolation and the formation of inward-looking communities
for the poor (Güvenç and Işık, 2002, 217). In this sense Aksoy and Robin’s (1994)
criticisms against the advocates of “new cosmopolitanism” and “cultural mosaic”
                                                
10 It is interesting  to note that while Calderia views the loss of public space as contrary to modernism,
Aksoy and Robins (1994) argues this process is a direct result of modernity and rationality.
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seem to hold true. This is so because any kind of mosaic needs mortar in order to
unite the pieces, and as Işık (1994-1995) states, the logic and common ground that
unites the elements of a city and social structure is becoming absent.
An important aspect of this development can also be put as the disappearance
of trust between the groups that make up the metropolis society. According to
Sztompka (1999), trust in a society promotes cooperation, binds individuals and
community, encourages sociability and participation, enriches the networks of
interpersonal ties, enlarges the field of interactions, allows for intimacy of
interpersonal contact, and increases moral density, social capital and civic
engagement as well as tolerance, acceptance of strangers and endurance to inter-
group conflicts. It is obvious that for a peaceful, harmonious and emancipatory
society these aspects are almost ‘must’s. On the contrary, distrust results in the
decline of social capital, communication between people and interpersonal networks,
the rise of xenophobia, increase in alienation and uprootness of individuals and the
emergence of criminal activities and social fragmentation. From the above
arguments, it can be inferred that a “culture of distrust” is rising with its all negative
consequences influencing urban life and urban public space. The roots of “collective
counter-culture of self-defense” that is so visible in today’s world cities and also in
Istanbul seems to be a result of this “culture of distrust”. In this sense, today’s public
spaces of metropolises are shaped by the severe forms of bio-politics aimed to
achieve and institutionalize “public hygiene”. This picture certainly proves Akay’s
(2001) claim about the emergence of a police and control society to be true. Aksoy
and Robins (1994, 64) rightly state that:
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Such an ideal of a new civic is very far from being realized in
Istanbul, and, moreover, that the forces of change may also be
working in ways that actually obstruct or inhibit the development
of such a vital urban culture. As in other global cities, what may be
emerging in reality are new forms of segmentation and cleavage
among different groups in urban population. At best, this may
result in the refusal of encounters, as particular groups elect to live
in relative isolation; at worst, however, it provides the basis for
new forms of urban conflict and confrontation.
Calderia (1999) states that the previous form of public space was
characterized by openness, egalitarian and communitarian ideals and universality. On
the contrary, today’s public space is characterized by separateness and disagreeable
differences. While her view on previous public space is highly questionable, her
view on the contemporary one is appropriate.
3.1.2.1 New Mode of Public Space and Urban Conflict
The above quotation from Aksoy and Robins indicates the possibility of new forms
of urban conflict and confrontations.
In this section, possible forms of urban conflicts and confrontations will be
explored. There are various studies on the effect of the (new) mode of public space
on urban conflict. In these studies, the relationship between crime and fragmentation
/ disintegration of social groups is discussed. Shihadeh and Ousey (1996, 649), for
example, state that “degree of suburbanization in a metropolitan area is positively
related to the rates of serious crime in the incorporated center-city”. The important
point in this study is the distinction between the black and white criminality, which
actually points to a class division (see for instance Wilson, 1987). These authors
argue that center city rates of serious crime in the Black community, not among the
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whites, are rising with suburbanization due to mediating factors. In another research
conducted by Shihadeh and Flynn (1996) the relationship between Black isolation
and Black violence was explored. This study is important for its premises. The first
one is the argument that residential segregation is a qualitatively distinct type of
inequality. In concrete terms, the inequalities aroused from geographical separation
and segregation must be identified from other types of inequalities, such as income,
education and occupational prestige. The second premise is the argument concerning
different types of segregation, namely, unevenness, centralization, concentration,
clustering and isolation, which are not “five measures of the same phenomenon, but
five distinct ways in which two or more groups live separately from one another”
(Massey and Denton, 1988, cited in Shihadeh and Flynn, 1996, 1328). The term
isolation refers to the low degree of potential contact between the social groups
across geographic subareas of a spatial unit. In this sense the term isolation is a
definitive term for contemporary public space. Another important point in this article
is the distinction made by the authors between urban violence and Black urban
violence. This is important since conceptualization of violence in terms of social
groups provides the researchers the opportunity to comprehend the specific dynamics
of the violent behaviors of different social groups. The concluding argument of the
study can be put as the evidence of a positive correlation between social isolation and
Black urban violence.
The factors behind this are the violation of the norm of achievement, that is to
say, segregation, and specifically isolation, produces an ascriptive form of inequality
that weakens the norms inhibiting violence; the situation that obscures and acts
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against social and economic mobility that is strengthened by cultural and political
factors; and lastly, the geographical concentration of negative aspects, such as
poverty, joblessness, and social malaise in a single ecological space.
In sum, these studies show that the new mode of public space that is
characterized by isolation produces unrest because of economic, social, cultural and
political factors. Among the related factors, erosion of meritocratic principles and the
increase of ascriptive form of inequality appear to be the most important ones.
However, despite the important information available in the literature, the category
of the “unrest” is usually missing and remains unexplored.
In the attempt to categorize unrest, it is possible to argue that, in general, with
respect to social groupings, there are four categories of conflict and confrontation,
namely, inter-group individual conflict, inter-group collective conflict, intra-group
individual conflict, and intra-group collective conflict. It is also possible to give
common examples to these categories: For the inter-group individual conflict,
burglaries and snatch theft that constitute an important portion of the urban crime in
Istanbul, at least in the media; for the inter-group collective conflict, the 1996
Mayday events in Istanbul; for the intra-group individual conflicts Black ghetto
crime in USA’s cities, such as rape and assassination; and finally, for the intra-group
collective conflicts recent events in Esenler district in Istanbul.
What is usually discussed is the inter-group collective and inter-group
individual conflicts and confrontations. The rhetoric used in these discussions is
usually marked by the terms crime, criminality and violence. In the media and
popular public discourses, these confrontations are usually explained with reference
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to individualistic elements, such as degeneration, deviance and pathology. The
“underclass” debates, usually used by conservative scholars like Charles Murray,
constitute a stereotypical example to this kind of rhetoric.
In Turkey, the picture is more or less the same. It is usually the members of
popular media who use this kind of a “methodology” to “analyze” urban criminality
and unrest. Despite their heavy influence on the society, fortunately Turkish scholars
are aware of the need to pass beyond this simplistic “explanation”, based on
individual pathology. Thus, there are increasing, yet not sufficient numbers of studies
conducted that are more or less able to pass beyond such simplistic views.
Unfortunately, these scholarly studies are heavily concentrated on the inter-group
collective conflicts and confrontations. In my point of view, in fact, what is crucial is
intra-group collective conflicts at best, and clashes at worst.
As stated in Chapter II, in Turkish metropolises, it is the communitarian
informal networks (CIN) of the poor, which not only prevent these groups from
extreme forms of poverty, but also give them the chance for upward mobility.
However, recently, the CIN are increasingly eroding, and also evolving into a new
form of network, that is the ethnic and religious cleavages. This development results
in two important consequences, namely, the danger of the formation of an
“underclass” and the rise of ethnicity among the poor in Turkish metropolises. It is
this reality, in addition to the new mode of public space that constitutes the ground of
intra-group conflict, confrontation and unrest among the poor. The logic of this
statement is briefly as follows: isolation in metropolis prevents the poor to compare
themselves with the rich, since actual and symbolic walls remove the possibility of
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interaction between these social groups, producing two truly separated “societies”.
On the other hand, the poor, who were previously fragmented along networks based
on primordial ties, are acceleratedly pushed to the “real ghettos” of involuntary
closures. This results in limited interaction of the poor with other social groups, and,
thus, only comparison that becomes available is between the poor groups of informal
networks. Moreover, limited resources for the groups among the poor produce
conflict among them. The “privileged” group of poor becomes the object of
comparison that turns them to be the hostile in the eyes of the “unprivileged” poor.
Actually, this process also works for the “privileged” poor: they start to perceive the
other poor as their enemies trying to possess their resources. This leads to a vicious
circle of hostilities. Furthermore, conflict generally result in the rise of identity /
ethnic politics, as a result of the evolution of the CIN into ethnic cleavages, which
may also bring traditional hostilities to the surface.
In order to understand the lack of comparison between the rich and the poor,
and the heightened comparison among the poor, a phenomenon which is
strengthened by the newly emerging spatial pattern of the cities, namely the isolation
of different quarters of different social classes and groups that diminishes the social
spaces in which members of different classes and groups interact in equal status, the
concepts of relative deprivation and comparative reference group must be analyzed.
At first glance, it is surprising and contrary to the common view to note that it
is the members of the social groups who are nearer to the top of the social hierarchy,
who are resentful and critical of the social systems rather than the bottom groups
(Runciman, 1966). Thus, there is a discrepancy between one’s social position and his
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/ her rejecting or accepting it. This is so because of the fact that “people’s attitudes,
aspirations and grievances largely depend on the frame of reference within which
they are conceived” (Ruciman, 1966).
Although at first sight a paradox, it has become a commonplace
that steady poverty is the best guarantee of conservatism: if people
have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve,
they will be less discontented with what they have, or even grateful
simply to be able to hold on to it. But if, on the other hand, they
have been led to see as a possible goal the relative prosperity of
some more fortunate community with which they can directly
compare themselves, then they will remain discontented with their
lot until they have succeeded in catching up (Runciman, 1966, 9).
It is possible, at least to sense that, in the process of comparison and
“decision” of the reference groups, there is a “law” regulating the process of
comparisons, which results in relative deprivation that can lead to action. In other
words, reference group comparison that causes dissatisfaction is not an “arbitrary”
process. So in loose terms, it is possible to argue that there are “legitimate” and
“illegitimate” comparisons and feelings of injustice (Runciman, 1966). That is to say,
relative deprivation occurs only as a result of comparison between the groups that
have some similarities in status. The uprisings and revolutions in history, in general,
occurred at times of rising prosperity. At least, part of the rationale behind this
“strange observation” can be understood if one comprehends the issue by considering
the relative deprivation and reference group approach: at times of prosperity, social
groups’ tendency to compare themselves with upper strata strengthens as social
groups find rising similarity of opportunities with the upper strata, which in turn
leads to unrest whenever they realize that there is a gap between the opportunities of
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the two groups and so feel blocked and relatively deprived. On the other hand,
decades of decline may also cause relative deprivation as a result of disappointment
of stable expectations.
What is common to both situations is that people are made aware of
not having what they have been brought to think it feasible or
proper or necessary that they should have. The upsetting of
expectations provokes the sense of relative deprivation, which may
in turn provide impetus for drastic change (Runciman, 1996, 22).
Festinger’s (1968) study provides useful information in order to comprehend
the issue.
The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person
decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one’s
own increases ... In other words, there is self-imposed restriction in
the range of opinion or ability with which a person compares
himself (sic!) (Festinger, 1968, 217).
Thus, there is a selectivity in the choice of comparative reference groups
based on the degree of discrepancy / proximity of one’s status. When the optimum
degree of discrepancy / proximity exists, people tend to intend to move close to the
“level of aspiration” of “others like himself” / herself. It is this tendency that leads
people to engage in action to reduce the discrepancy. So it can be argued that there is
a tendency for unity between the persons who are similar to each other. The cessation
of comparison between divergent persons and groups in terms of abilities will not
lead to hostility or derogation, since the comparison loses its legitimacy. It is, indeed,
between comparable groups that possibility of conflict and confrontation occurs,
since they find the competition against each other more attainable. Finally, people
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tend to narrow down their range of competitive groups whenever they perceive the
divergence as resulting from the divergence of attributes (Festinger, 1968).
What can be inferred from these arguments related to urban conflict is that as
isolation, which makes comparison impossible between social groups, increases in
addition to widening economic and mental gap between the isolated groups, the poor
groups stop comparing themselves with the better-off groups. What they actually do
is to compare themselves with the “others like themselves”, that is, the subgroups of
the poor. The fragmented structure of the poor is important in the sense that it
provides subgroups to make comparisons between each other. If it is legitimate to
speculate, it can be said that whenever the poor fall to the bottom and “unite” in this
respect, it is then the poor would start comparing their situation with their previous
situation, which would lead to anti-systemic unrest. Until this kind of a situation
occurs, the poor would continue to make comparison with each other, which
produces confrontation within this group.
3.2 From Communitarian Informal Networks to Ethnic and Religious Cleavages
Since the 1990’s identity politics has been gaining importance. The protests as a
response to widening gap between the classes, increasing inequalities, and social,
political and cultural domination started to be expressed in terms of identity rather
than economic struggles. Since this period Kurdish, Islamic and Alevi identities have
been the major components of identity politics (Ayata, 1997).
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The rise of ethnic and religious cleavages can be analyzed through exploring
both the developments in macro scale, namely, the wider context of Turkey, and the
developments in Turkish metropolises, which is done in the following sections.
3.2.1 The Rise of Ethnic and Religious Cleavages in Turkey: The Perspectives
Based on Macro Analysis
Keyder, in his 1997 dated study, analyzes the “tradition” of modernization in Turkish
society since the late Ottoman and early Republican period. He argues that, what
characterizes Turkish modernization is the phenomenon of “modernization from
above”, which enabled modernizers not to apply or promote all dimensions of
modernization, but the ones that are parallel to their own interests. This, in addition
to the permanent gap between the ruling / modernizing elite and the masses, caused
the alienation of masses from the project of modernity and a perception of modernity
as the instrument of the authoritarian state emerged. Consequently, the national
identity that was intended to be constructed by the ruling / modernizing elite was
never fully accepted by the masses. Corollary to this, in the 1990’s, with the
increased legitimacy crisis of the Turkish state, ethnic and sectarian identities started
to rise.
Keyman (1995) asks how nationalism and the process of national identity
formation have resulted in the rise of Islamic identity in recent decades in Turkey.
According to him, the decline of the hegemonic discourse of national identity
resulted in the emergence and strengthening of different political identities based on
gender, Islam, and ethnicity. Moreover, as nationalist discourse lost its unifying
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function, the state started to apply Islamic discourse as an alternative to Kemalist
national identity as a unifying force to safeguard the state.
Also the newly emerging global economy and its cultural impulses have
promoted the rise of identity politics and Islamic political parties (Öniş, 1997). Öniş
(1997) argues that structural aspects of the economic and cultural spheres provided
groups and communities the means to express their identities and organize
themselves around issues concerning individual or group identity.
In sum, the process of modernization and attitudes of modernizers, alienation
of the masses from the modernization project, the crisis of legitimacy and hegemony
of the state and the discourse of Turkish national identity, the post-1980 policies that
applied Islamic discourse as an unifying force, and globalizing economy are the
major factors behind the rise of identity politics in Turkey in the 1990’s.
3.2.2 The Rise of Ethnic and Religious Cleavages in the Urban Context
Kazgan  (2001) states that the Kustepe quarter of Istanbul, which can be categorized
in the “surpassedbelt” of the city of Istanbul, has never achieved either the inter-
integration with the city or the intra-integration between the hemsehri groups. This
picture of the absence of integration in both domains can be generalized to other
“surpassed” quarters of the metropolises. The underlying factor behind the absence
of intra-integration is the fragmented structure of poor residences along the informal
networks based on non-modern ties, mainly of families and groups of origin. This
fragmented structure strengthens whenever competition over resources increases
(Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991). In fact, the competition over interest increases and takes
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aggressive forms as the state abandons the already limited welfare promotions. As a
response, the networks turn to be exclusionary communities seeking self-interest and
the means to enhance their “transformation capacity”. Thus, the anonymity of the
city leaves its place to fragmented “totalities” characterized by communitarian
relationships (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 334). These communities, previously
based on family and hemsehrilik, increasingly take a form of ethnic / religious
cleavages, in addition to their adoption “mafiatic” attributes (Şengül, 2001). In this
respect, Erkip’s (2000, 374) statement pointing to the changing face of Istanbul
towards an arena of different ethnic, religious and communal backgrounds is of
considerable importance. While on the one hand, there is a convergence of religious /
ethnic communities and mafiatic attitudes (Güvenç and Işık, 2002, 215-216), on the
other hand, metropolises face with the politization of ethnic / sectarian communities
and identities (see Ayata, 1997). Ayata (1997) defines various factors behind the rise
of urban ethnicity, such as minority consciousness and “us” versus “them”, the
feeling of threat against one’s culture and identity, the failure in integration and
adaptation to urban society, socio-economic inequalities between the identity groups,
and the solidarity networks usually based on religion, and mediated and controlled by
religious groups, namely, tarikats. Although, Ayata’s arguments provide important
insight about the rise of ethnicity and identity politics in the urban context, in the
following sections these arguments will be developed by analyzing first the
perspectives on ethnicity and then the evolution of networks among the poor.
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i) Perspectives on Ethnicity: Primordial versus Structural and Situational Views
In general, perspectives on ethnicity can be classified into two broad categories. One
of these categories can be named as the primordial view.
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the
‘givens’ or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such
matters, the assumed ‘givens’ of social existence: immediate
contiguity and live connection mainly, but beyond them the
givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious
community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a
language, and following particular social practices. These
congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an
ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of
themselves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s
fellow believer, ipso facto, as the result not merely of personal
attraction, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral
obligation but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable
absolute import attributed to the very tie itself (Geertz, 1963, 109,
cited in Rex, 1989, 27).      
This view considers ethnicity as an unchanging identity, which is indifferent
to external pressures and developments. In this sense, ethnicity has its own dynamics
independent from other elements or domains of the societal life. In brief, primordial
view perceives ethnicity as more or less a static identity.
The second perspective on ethnicity can be divided into two sub-categories,
namely, structural view and situational view. These two views are, in fact,
complementary rather than oppositional. While structural view deals with relations
between classes, races and ethnic groups that can be labeled as macro issues,
situational view is concerned with micro issues, in more concrete terms it examines
here-and-now aspects of societal life. In brief, structural view examines the position
of ethnicity in the given social structure. On the other hand, situational view
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examines the function of ethnicity as a resource to attain ends, which can be latent or
ignored (Rex, 1989, 26-28).
Recent developments prove that the formation of different identities is a
matter and aspect of societal life. In other words, identities are not given, static and
more importantly ahistorical. Rather, different identities emerge and fade away as the
social structure changes. The rise of working class identity by the onset of the 19th
century, and its fall by the mid 1970’s can be regarded as an evidence of the dynamic
nature of identity depended on the social structure. So rather than primordial
perspective on ethnicity, situational and structural perspectives are more appropriate
to use in ethnicity studies.
Certainly, the rise of urban ethnicity in Turkish metropolises must be
regarded in this framework. As a before hand conclusion, it can be argued that the
rise of urban ethnicity in Turkish metropolises has utilitarian reasons, in addition to
structural ones. The decline of the CIN and their already existing features that can
very easily be transformed into ethnicity are of considerable importance in this
process.
ii) The “Rational Choice” of the Poor to Re-Regulate and Re-Define Their
Pattern of Relationship by Ethnicity
Having argued for the utilitarian reasons of the rise of ethnicity, in this section,
“rational choice” of the poor to re-regulate and re-define their pattern of relationship
by ethnicity will be explored.
Narayanan (1989, 184) states that, in societies in which there exist different
ethnic groups, the pattern of relationship between these groups are very much
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influenced by external environment in instrumental aspects, mainly for security. She
further argues that, in ethnically pluralistic settings, structural aspects play a more
important role for ethnicity and issues related to ethnicity more than cultural factors:
“more than cultural factors it is social relationships that are important in establishing
group identity and a sense of community” (Narayanan, 1989, 147). The most
important domains of social structure appear to be the economic and political
domains that contribute to the rise of ethnicity (Rex, 1989).
Clearly any realist account of what brings racial and ethnic groups
together must refer to the structure of the polity and the
economy…Even insofar as race and ethnicity are, of themselves,
potentially important sources of in-group unity and intra-group
division, their potential does require a structural content if it is to
become activated. Racial and ethnic differences might very well be
latent for long periods. When, however, groups or quasi-groups
thus differentiated come into economic or political relations with
each other, such latent relations become salient in a new way (Rex,
1989, 35-36, emphasis added).
What turns latent ethnicity into salient ethnicity is the rational choice of the
social and political actors that seek opportunities to upgrade their lives in the given
social structure. When aspects of social structure provide opportunity for those actors
to upgrade their lives by using their ethnic identities, the actors bring them forward.
In this sense, rational choice theory provides a useful insight for researchers to
comprehend the rise of ethnicity in Turkish metropolises, although this perspective
has important limitations in itself (see Malesevic 2002; Rex, 1989, 29).
Following a perspective holding the premise of the importance of economic
and political structure and the pragmatic / utilitarian choice of actors to upgrade their
lives, one can define the rising importance of ethnic and religious networks, political
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parties, organizations and networks, and NGO’s for the survival of the poor as a
result of the evolution of the networks of the poor that points to a new pattern of
relationship among the poor, and the rise of ethnicity as the new determinant of the
patterns of relationships among the poor. This would help to demystificate urban
ethnicity in Turkish metropolises.
In the following sections of the thesis, the evolution of the networks of the
poor and the rise of urban ethnicity as a consequence of this change will be explored.
3.2.2.1 The Evolution of the Networks of the Poor and the Rise of Urban
Ethnicity
In chapter 2, the networks of the poor were explored by drawing upon the literature.
In the final section of the chapter, it was argued the networks of the poor are
changing in response to changing social context, which makes networks dynamic
entities rather than static ones. In this line, the CIN of the poor are argued to be
qualitatively distinct from the rural ties, although they originated from them. Also, it
was implied that recent developments indicate that the CIN are transforming into a
new pattern of relationship that is qualitatively different than the CIN. In this section,
the trend of the decline of the CIN as a mode of regulatory relationship among the
poor and the rise of urban ethnicity as the new mode of regulation and interaction
among the poor will be explored. But before doing this, some observations on the
CIN and the mechanisms behind them, namely the family pooling and the ‘poverty in
turns’, will be discussed.
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i) Comparative Analysis of the Family Pool Model and the Poverty in Turns
Mechanism
In the previous chapter, both the family pool model and the ‘poverty in turns’
mechanism were analyzed. By the help of this analysis, it is possible to comprehend
some distinctive and important features of the proposed models, which constitute
both the strong and the weak sides of the models.
Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç’s (2001) model of family pooling is constructed on a
comprehensive perspective of survival means of the poor. They have identified
fifteen different resources that contribute to family pooling. In addition to these, they
have identified secondary or indirect resources, which brace the mechanism. On the
other hand, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) focus on urban rent as the only resource, on
which the survival and well being of the poor depend. While the comprehensive
analysis of Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç is the strong point of the model of family pooling,
the in-depth study of Işık and Pınarcıoğlu on the use of urban rent makes the
mechanism of ‘poverty in turns’ a good descriptive model. However, the very same
aspects of these studies constitute the weaknesses of their models. Simply the
absence of any information about the relative importance of the fifteen resources for
the survival of the mechanism in the family pool model, and the absence of any
information about the resources other than urban rent in the ‘poverty in turns’ model
can be argued to be the weaknesses in the models proposed. Certainly, if we combine
these two models rather than taking them as granted, we are able to gain a deeper and
more comprehensive insight into the CIN. By doing this, we can also comprehend
the link between the family and hemsehri ties.
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In fact, urban rent as a resource that contributes to family pooling, has been
proposed by Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001), by the clause “provision of house, land,
property”, without any description of the way of acquiring this provision. However,
if we regard the study of Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) as a long and comprehensive
description of the ‘provision of house, land, property”, the whole picture becomes
apparent. We can define the whole picture of the CIN as follows: Among the fifteen
resources proposed by Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, the most crucial one appears to be
urban rent, which is, most of the time, acquired through the use of hemsehri relations
and ties. In this way the networks and the relationships among the poor, which are
primarily family based, expand through the kins and hemsehris. In sum, in my
interpretation, the operation of the CIN is parallel to the model proposed by
Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, but with greater and significant importance of urban rent as
the primary source of the mechanism and hemrehrlik as an important and
complimentary pattern of relationship among the poor.
ii) Decline of the CIN as a Historical Pattern of Relationship Among the Poor
Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001) propose several cases in which the family pool model
does not help to the well being of the poor. The below schema illustrates these cases.
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Figure 3-1) The conditions in which the coping strategies do not work in the large / extended family
scale (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001).
Although this schema provides important information about “the conditions
in which coping strategies do not work in the large / extended family scale”, it is also
visible that these conditions are either individual or exceptional cases except for the
first and sixth ones. In order to identify the general and structural conditions or











Downward mobility/ poverty /
Getting poorer
Household head / male members of the family not
being able to work (disabled sick old dead went
Intrafamily conflicts (marriage with an unwanted
partner,etc.)
Not allowing women to get employment outside of  home
Regional differences for support from ethnic and
religious networks (some groups from among Alevis
Personality differences (brothers and sisters not
wanting to share, stingent fathers who do not give any
support,  jealousy between relatives, etc.)
Unemployable household head/or male members
of the family/unemployment related to lack of
essential skills for the formal sector jobs
Culture of poverty / Reluctance, lack of knowledge or
lack of resources of the family so that it could not
The large number of dependent members in the
crowded family like old people, very young children
Reluctance or inability of  the women in the family to
built relations with the social environment
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As it was shown above, there are fifteen sources that feed the system. Any
defect, affecting the resource flow to the center, means a stroke to the system.
Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001) argue that today while the significance of the material
support of relatives living in a foreign country, child labor, woman’s domestic labor
and income of woman by domestic and / or public labor is preserved and even
increased, whereas social security and health support, regular income from formal
sector, income from informal sector, country side support and the probability of
acquiring home, land and real estate are in decline. Any comparison of the relative
economic significance of the increasing and decreasing resources shows that it is the
resources, which are in decline that provide the most significant support to the family
pool. This infers that the shift in the availability of the resources is far from
promoting upward mobility or even maintaining the present economic status. Indeed,
there is a clear indication of downward mobility as a result of the imbalance between
what is lost and what is gained.
Like the resources in the first circle of the model, the resources in the outer
circles must also be analyzed. Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001) state that hemsehri ties
and the neighborhood, friendship, imagined kinship and employer support are in
decline as well. Moreover, public services, such as free education and health, social
security, pork barrels, employment opportunities in the public sector, and juristical
regulations are far from benefiting the poor. So what is left in the outer circles is the
ethnic / religious networks, political parties, organizations and networks, and the
NGO’s that would promote the means of well being of the poor.
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In the previous chapter, hemsehri networks are defined as hierarchical
organizations built upon profit enhancement. The primary sources of profit
enhancement are said to be the land and job markets. So it is necessary to examine
the changes in these domains in order to comprehend the future of hemsehri
networks. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) point that the continuity of the mechanism of
‘poverty in turns’ depends upon continuous growth in land and job markets. The
continuous growth of the land and job markets, in turn, stands on two prerequisites,
namely, a dynamic economic structure, which highly depends on urban rant, and
continuity of flow of “consumers”, who are to be the new migrants (Işık and
Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 336).
The availability of urban rant is in sharp decline for two reasons. First, after
about five decades of migration to metropolises, there remained almost no land to be
occupied in the peripheries of metropolises in general and of Istanbul in particular
(Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 340). The second factor is the capital’s / formal
market’s inclination to move towards the peripheries of the cities as their sites of
investment (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 63), which is discussed above.
There is one more point to be considered, which lies in the social
psychological motives / inclinations of individuals. The hierarchical structure of the
networks has already discussed above. Although this is a hierarchy based on profit
among the members of the networks, it must be considered that all the members of
the network benefit from these networks, despite the inequalities inherent in the
networks.
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The profitability of the networks for the members at the lower ranks of the
hierarchy depends on the patronage of the higher rank members in housing and job
markets (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a). However, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a, 340)
point to the possibility of cession of the higher rank members from the networks.
According to the authors, this would terminate the whole logic of the mechanism,
since patronage of higher rank members is a crucial element for the operation of the
mechanism. Also, due to the reasons explained above, the formation of a new “elite”
that would fulfill the requirements of patronage seems to be difficult. Işık and
Pınarcıoğlu (2001b, 42-43) conclude as follows:
The pyramidal networks originated in the “poverty in turns” process
do not possess a continuous character because of their class
structure. Particularly, the ones who are at the top of the pyramid
have a permanent tendency to leave the networks and to get in touch
with different interest groups. In such a situation, there is always a
probability to break up the invisible ties with the ones who are at the
bottom of the pyramid. Especially, when the illegal process becomes
legalized, a complete disappearance of communitarian rules may
occur. In such a condition, entering into other networks and finding
new lands to occupy and benefiting from these lands by opening
them to the new comers becomes the only hope of the ones at the
bottom of the pyramid. In this way, the continuation of the
preconditions of the continuous growth is necessary for the
continuation of the process of ‘poverty in turns’. This is possible
only by forming new networks and by the existence of land at the
peripheries of the city, which is to be occupied. However, this
process is moving toward an end due to the slowing down of
migration to the cities and to the running out of the land that is to be
easily occupied. This indicates an end for the ‘poverty in turns’ as an
regulatory mechanism, and the formation of an underclass without
any regulatory rule, or in other words, the new poverty.
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iii) The Outer Circles of the Mechanism of the CIN and the Rise of Urban
Ethnicity
It has already been stated that while the primary sources, which feed the mechanism
of the CIN, to operate and become the primary aspect of the pattern of relationship
among the poor, are acceleratedly diminishing, the sources, which were previously
secondary, namely, ethnic and religious networks, political parties, organizations and
networks, and NGOs, are becoming the primary resource supplies for the poor,
which are indeed in a hierarchy according to their relative importance, respectively
(Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001). So what is on the agenda in the metropolises is the
increased importance of ethnic and religious networks for the survival of the poor. In
addition to ethnic and religious networks, the importance of political parties,
organizations and networks is also visible in the informal neighborhood quarters11.
The NGO support is still a secondary resource for the urban poor, since civil
organizations in Turkey are not institutionalized and have not gained significance in
public life in its full terms (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001).
Ethnic and religious networks and NGO’s do not require deeper analysis in
the boundaries of this study, since the former has a self-evident factor for the rise of
urban ethnicity, and the latter is weak and unimportant12. However, political parties,
                                                
11 This development is, indeed, observed by many scholars working on informal neighborhoods and
urbanization in Tukey. Also this fact was observed in the recent field study conducted by Assoc.
Prof.Tahire Erman in Ege quarter of Mamak, Ankara.
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organizations and networks and their effects on the rise of urban ethnicity must be
analyzed, since these have important contributions to the rise of urban ethnicity.
The contribution of political parties, organizations and networks to the rise of
urban ethnicity can be examined by following the clientelist politics that is deeply
rooted in Turkish society. Although the evolutionist perspective on clientelism states
that clientelist politics is a step towards modern politics, the existence of clientelist
relationships in different degrees almost in every region of the world shows the fault
of this perspective. Rather, what seems to be a more realist perspective is the
articulationist perspective that suggests the coexistence of different modes of
political activity. In this perspective, modern politics and clientelist relationships are
not only compatible but also can replace each other: whenever institutional or
modern regulations or aspects of politics fail, clientelist relationships fill the gap.
However, in Turkey, clientelism plays a much more significant role than filling the
gaps.
From the 17th and 18th century Ottoman times to the post-1980 military coup
era, clientelism has always been an important aspect of politics in Turkish society in
different modes, in accordance with structural developments13. The major change in
the mode of clientelism in Turkish politics occurred by the multi-party period. In this
period the previously dominant form of traditional clientelism transformed itself into
                                                                                                                                         
12 Erder (1998, 113) observes increasing efforts of certain groups in order to prevent the rise,
especially, of religious communities by forming “civil” organizations. This shows how seriouss  the
developments are, as well as the awareness and discomfort of certain groups from this. However, as
stated above these efforts are far from being significant in the public life. Also, my observation in
Kadıköy, Istanbul, indicates that some organizations so called civil society organizations or NGO’s
are far from being independent from political parties or organizations. In this sense, influences of the
so called civil society organizations and NGO’s on the urban ethnicity can be followed in the frame of
clientelist politics of political parties and organizations.
13 There are various studies on clientelism in Ottoman state and Turkish Republic. Some of these
works   are as follows: Kudat (1975); Sayarı(1975; 1977); Özbudun (1980; 1981); Eisenstadt and
Roniger (1984); Güneş-Ayata (1990; 1994); Şahin (1999).
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client-broker and party-patronage mode of clientelism. The main difference between
traditional clientelism and the client-broker and party-patronage modes is the source
of the resources, which the patrons use in order to gain profit from their clients.
While in traditional clientelism patrons primarily use their own resources, in client-
broker and party-patronage modes, brokers or political parties provide support to
their clients by using the resources of the state rather than their own individual
resources (see Güneş-Ayata, 1990). Despite there are significant differences between
traditional and contemporary clientelism which mainly arise from the kind of the
resource that is used to build clientelist relationship, there is a main aspect that is
inherent in any kind of clientelist relationship, namely, the unequal and exploitative
nature of the relationship as well as its counter-effect on the formation of class
consciousness and class politics (see Şahin 1999).
    One of the objectives of the 1980 military coup is said to to dissolute
clientelistic networks of the political parties at any level in order to clean the
“dirtiness of politics”. To do this, in the new constitution related items and the law of
political parties were changed (Schuler 1998, in Şahin, 1999, 97). However, contrary
to the objectives of the military coup, by the 1980’s clientelist relationships spread
out to the society more than the pre-coup era (Schuler 1998, 117, in Şahin 1999, 99).
Şahin (1999, 99) observes the reason and results of the failure of the coup to prevent
clientetist relations as follows:
Together with applications, realized by military government,
aiming at depolitization of important spheres of society; the image
of being party of “technocrats and pragmatical solutions”, nucleus
of which was created by MP, resulted in de-ideologisation  of party
programs and created an impression in public opinion that any
grassroots party in center could be substituted by others. Political
strategies based on class oriented organization of masses and anti-
communism as an ideological symbol, lost their popularities,
especially with the collapse of socialist block. Parallel to these
changes, ethnic divisions started to forego.
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After the military coup and Motherland Party (MP) government Turkey’s
economy entered into a new phase. The new economic policies were towards the
integration of the country’s economy with the global system. In order to achieve this
goal, new regulations in economy took place. In order to achieve the restructuring of
the economy, social, political and administrative regulations also took place. The
increased rights and responsibilities of the municipalities was one of the new
administrative regulations. This, in turn, had considerable effect on the political life
in localities. The establishment of new clientelist relations based on urban rents again
appeared. In the local elections of 1990 the victory of the Social Democratic Populist
Party (SDPP) was a result of its ability to continue and strengthen clientelist relations
in addition to SDPP’s inclination towards ethnic politics (Şahin, 1999).
Actually these developments were not a qualitatively new phenomenon. As
discussed above, before the 1980’s clientelism in various forms, either in traditional
or in party-patronage mode, was a character of Turkish politics. However, by the
1980’s destructive consequences of clientelism came into existence in many domains
of society, namely, corruption (Şahin, 1999) and the rise of ethnic cleavages. Of
course it would be exaggeration to claim that the only reason of corruption and the
rise of ethnic cleavages is clientelism. But it can be argued that clientelism
strengthened and accelerated the process of spreading of corruption to many domains
of the society as well as the rise of ethnicity, as mentioned in the quotation.
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3.2.3 The Rise of Conflict Between the Ethnic and Religious Groups Among the
Poor in Turkish Metropolises
In the above sections, the new mode of public space, and comparative reference
group and relative deprivation approaches were explored in order to provide
information about the rise of unrest in metropolises among the poor. In addition to
this, the factors behind the rise of ethnicity as the new determinant of the pattern of
relationship among the poor in Turkish metropolises were analyzed. In brief, in
previous sections two important arguments were stated, that is, the rise of unrest
among the poor and the rise of urban ethnicity in Turkish metropolises. From these
arguments, it can be inferred that the unrest in metropolises will be / is between
ethnic / religious groups among the poor.
It is generally accepted that informal networks are stabilizing forces for Third
World countries, which have experienced rapid urbanization. There are several
observations behind this view that are related to the characteristics of the networks.
First of all, it is argued that since informal networks cut across social classes, they
work as counter forces against the formation of class consciousness and loyalties
among the poor. Secondly, these networks protect the poor against anomie,
normlessness and alienation. They turn to be agents of socialization that provide a
sense of community and collective identity, which help the poor to integrate into the
urban political order. And thirdly, these networks, by having the function of
providing aid and assistance, provide the poor material support in the form of shelter,
food and the like, in the absence of any other sources or support. Furthermore,
informal networks are the only instrument of the poor in many cases by which the
poor members of the networks convey their demands to the local or central
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governments or to other political actors who have the power to provide services and /
or support to the poor (Denoeux, 1993, 17). This conduct of demands becomes
possible by the existence of a “patron” at the top of the hierarchy of the network,
who functions as a broker between the locality and the decision making actors. Since
the broker type of patrons have an important role for the networks, their
characteristics and motives become important aspects of the stabilizing role of the
networks. First, since the broker type patrons are part of the political system and
“part of the government apparatus”, and since they have hegemonic role in the
network, they play a role in “softening” the demands of the urban poor (Bienen,
1984, 669, cited in Denoeux, 1993,17). Secondly, Nelson (1979, 394 & 166, cited in
Denoeux, 1993, 18) suggests that there is a ”conservative bias” emerging from the
fact that “neither traditional leaders nor patrons are likely to use the political power
inherent in their followings to bring about substantial change, since such change
would almost surely undermine their own position”. Finally, Cornelius (1975; 1977,
cited in Denoeux, 1993, 18) also provides evidence to the integrative and controlling
role of the broker type patrons in his study conducted on the Mexican urban poor.
Also the motives of the poor in the networks are of considerable importance.
Basically, the primary motive of the poor is to integrate into the urban system.
Obtaining immediate benefits are the primary concern of this group. So they are
willing to participate rather than to work against the existing system. As a
consequence, cooperation with the brokers and patrons turns to be a more rational
choice for the poor rather than following revolutionary ideas and leaders
(Huntington, 1968, 280, cited in Denoeux, 1993, 18).
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In sum, informal networks’ characteristics, such as their position cross-
cutting social classes, their socializing role and function as a provider of material
support, the broker type patrons at the top of the networks, and the motives of their
members to integrate into urban society are claimed to be the bases of these
networks’ stabilizing role.
Erder (1997), a scholar of urban informal networks in Turkey, also states that
the primary goal of the urban poor is to integrate into urban society, to gain
legitimization and establishment in urban life and to find access to urban public
services. The informal networks of the poor are their primary apparatus to reach
these goals. Despite some counter effects of these networks on the integration
process, it is evident that these networks provide important means for this purpose.
However, as a result of “historical sedimentation”, informal networks ossified and
changed as a response to changing social context. As a consequence, today, they
have turned to be destabilizing forces, acting as a means of confrontation and unrest
in the poor quarters of the city, which I would call “surpassedbelt” of the
metropolises. In other words, they have become the means of intra-conflict among
the poor. At the heart of this development, there lie the increased resource scarcity
for the well being of the poor and the changing character of the networks, that is,
changing from the communitarian informal networks (CIN) to ethnic / religious
cleavages
Landis and Boucher (1987) state that whenever there is competition between
ethnic groups for economic, power or security goals, ethnic unrest rises. The motives
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of the actors and the intensity of the conflicts are the determinants of the degree of
the unrest. They further suggest that:
The frequency with which interethnic conflict involves a difference
in allocation of resources between groups in conflict makes it
tempting to suggest that interethnic contact becomes interethnic
conflict when such an imbalance occurs. While this is too simplistic
a suggestion, it does point to the importance of this theme… From
the conflicts discussed in this volume it appears that the issue of
allocation of resources is a more important source of conflict when
parties to the conflict occupy the same territory (Landis and
Boucher, 1987, 21-22).
Although the competition over material resources between ethnic groups is
argued to be the primary factor behind ethnic conflict, non-material contributors can
also be identified. Following Essed’s (1991) study on racism, it can be argued that
conflict over norms, values, non-material resources, and definition of the social
world are the non-material contributors to ethnic conflict14. In addition to these,
public discourse and everyday experiences (Essed, 1991), perceived or real threats to
identity (see Ayata, 1997; Grant and Brown, 1995), socialization patterns of new
generations, prejudices and stereotypes rooted in history can be identified as non-
material factors.
In Turkey, as mentioned above, resource scarcity among the poor is on the
agenda with its destructive effects on the lives of the poor. In fact, transition of the
CIN into ethnic / religious groupings as the primary tool of the poor to survive in the
metropolises is a result of this development. As the poor lose the means to continue
the CIN, they divert into ethnic / religious networks and political parties
                                                
14 It must be noted that race and ethnicity are different categories. However, there is a convergence
between the reasons behind the racıal and ethnic conflict. For a comparision between the concepts of
race and ethnicity  see Oommen (1994).
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organizations in order to replace the lost resources15. In this kind of networks
patronage and clientelist relationships become a much more important aspect of the
mechanism, compared to the CIN. Thus, the structure of politics in Turkey, that is,
political parties, organizations, constitution and laws, the characteristics, intentions
and motives of the cadres of the political parties and so on, is also an important factor
for ethnic conflicts. Party patronage and indifference of political leaders to use any
means to gain political power and the absence and / or prohibitions of class politics
are the major, previously external but contemporarily internal, contributor to the rise
of ethnic conflict in Turkish metropolises.
                                                
15 The relationship between the ethnic / religious networks and the political parties and organizations
is of considerable importance. Well known examples like the relations between the tarikats and right-
wing political parties and organizations, emergence of Peace Party by the influence of the Alevi
organizations in Europe that brings Alevi identity forward explicitly, the case of People’s Democracy
Party, the identification of the Republican People’s Party with  Alevi identity, especially in the poor
neighborhoods, the Welfare Party and its successors using a Sunni Islamic discourse and networks
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CONCLUSION
In the conclusion chapter of the thesis, first, a brief summary of the thesis will be
presented. Then, by the help of this brief summary, the findings of the thesis will be
discussed. Finally, suggestions will be put forward in order to provide a preliminary
outline for future urban studies.
In Chapter I of this thesis, by surveying the perspectives on the space and
society relationship, a general theoretical framework for the space and society
relationship is presented. By the help of this theoretical framework, spatial and social
developments in Western metropolises are examined. It is shown that transition from
Fordist to Post-Fordist economy has been the most important contributor to the
changes in social structure and newly emerging spatial organization in Western
metropolises. It is also shown that the loss of public space, as a result of these
developments, has important effects on social structure. By the decomposition of
quarters of different social groups and classes, ideational, economic, social, and
political fragmentation strengthens. In this chapter it is proved that spatial
organization of the contemporary Western metropolises has important effects on
marginalization, exclusion, and the formation of an “underclass” in these
metropolises.
In Chapter II, in order to follow the footprints of marginalization and
exclusion in Turkish metropolises, migrants, some sections of whom turned to be the
urban disadvantaged group, and their residences as social spaces, are focused. The
course of rural-to-urban migration, the position of migrants in the social structure of
the metropolises, and their survival means, namely, their informal networks are
examined with a historical perspective. It is shown that there was a relative balance
                                                                                                                                         
proves the convergence of the political organizations and the ethnic / religious networks.
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between integration and disintegration of migrants into the urban society in
metropolises. In other words, there was neither full exclusion nor full inclusion for
the migrants. This situation of relative balance was achieved by the help of informal
networks among these people who have roots in rural life. Although informal
networks of the poor evolved from rural ties, urban networks that are the
communitarian informal networks can by no means be classified as rural. From the
arguments proposed in this chapter, it can be inferred that networks of the poor in
Turkish metropolises are dynamic rather than static that adapt themselves to the
developments in societal life.
In Chapter III, social and spatial developments in Turkish metropolises,
particularly in Istanbul are examined. Similar to the Western case of transition from
Fordism to Post-Fordism, the economy policies of the post-1980 military coup era
appeared to be the most important determining factor for the changes in the Turkish
society and metropolises. In the societal domain, parallel to the changes in economy,
a new social group, named Turkish yuppies, emerged. This went hand in hand with
the opening gap between the rich and the poor. Another development in this domain
was the re-emergence or increasing importance of culture in the definitions of
“friends and foes”. Not only the rich and the poor, but also the “elite” rich and the
common rich dissociated from each other with reference to culture. These societal
developments reflected themselves on the spatial pattern of Istanbul. The sites of
consumption, leisure, business, and residence of social groups and classes became
separated from each other. This resulted in the loss of the ”ideal” public space and
the production of “false public spaces”, as in the case of Western metropolises.
However, social developments in Turkish metropolises in the domain of lower
classes are different from the their Western counterparts. In Turkish metropolises
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rather than the formation of an “underclass”, it is the rise of ethnic and religious
cleavages that is the pressing problem.
From the arguments inherent to this thesis, various findings can be brought
forward for discussion. These are as follows:
i) Space is a social entity that is influenced by and is influencing social affairs. Space
is by no means neutral. Rather, it is an entity that has a major role in shaping the
social structure, which is shaped by the social structure. This kind of a relationship is
a dialectical relationship having the full complexity of any dialectical relationship.
ii) Due to the dialectical nature of the space and society relationship, space reacts
upon society. This is a process that contributes to shaping the social structure.
However, attention must be paid not to forget other factors affecting the social and
spatial developments and changes. In other words, one must be aware of the danger
of falling into the trap of reductionism.
It is this awareness of the trap of reductionism, particularly spatial
reductionism that led the researcher to focus on socio-historical determinants of
social developments. The analysis of the “underclass” formation in Western
metropolises, and the rise of ethnic and religious cleavages among the poor as a
result of the evolution of the networks of the poor in Turkish metropolises, point to
the importance of socio-historical determinants for social developments.
iii) The literature on the networks of the poor implies functional aspects of these
networks. The same functionalist perspective is preserved in this thesis. The
functionalism of the networks, indeed, is not surprising or misleading. By following
the premises of Maslow’s ‘Hierarchy of Needs’, the roots of functionalism and the
pragmatic / utilitarian aspects of the networks and the functionalist approaches in the
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analyses become clear. However, there may be non-functionalist aspects of these
networks that are waiting to be explored by the social and political science students.
v) In the third chapter of the thesis, the rise of ethnic and religious cleavages in
Turkish metropolises is examined. The main factor behind this development is
argued to be the evolution of the communitarian informal networks of the poor into
ethnic and religious cleavages. In addition to this, the importance of the wider social
context and the political structure of the society appeared to be influential in this
process.
vi) It is almost self-evident that in Western societies the rise of micro-nationalism
and micro-ethnicity are pressing problems. So at first instance, one can be suspicious
about the reliability of this thesis, since it is argued that in Western metropolises
“underclass” is the pressing problem whereas in Turkey it is the rise of ethnic and
religious cleavages. However, this thesis concentrates on the disadvantaged classes
and groups of both societies. So it mainly examines the social developments by
considering these sections of the societies. If one regards the social bases of micro-
nationalism and micro-ethnicity in Western societies, which are the middle classes,
the possible suspicions about the reliability of this thesis loses their legitimacy.
vii) It appeared to be the economic domain that is the most important determinant of
the social as well as spatial developments in recent decades. In Western societies, it
is the economic transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, and in Turkey post-1980
neo-liberal export-oriented economy policies that has the major influence on society
and (social) space.
vii) Although economy has the determining influence on whole society, its effects
differ with respect to differences in societal groupings and classes. While new
economic regulations in both Western and Turkish societies favor the upper classes
116
and professionals, then work contrary to the benefits of middle and lower classes. So
it can be argued that what appears to be the influence of economics on the whole
society is the effect of economy on the societal patterns of interaction among the
individuals and social groups and classes. Through this insight, a new understanding
or conceptualization of “society” based on interaction patterns between the parts in a
given “fragmented totality” can be reached and strengthened.
viii) The trend of the loss of public space is universal among the world metropolises.
This points to the increasing decomposition, disintegration and fragmentation of the
societies that are usually considered to be unitary. Thus, rather than the emergence of
new cosmopolitanism, the emergence of new fragmentations and isolation is a more
realist conclusion for the recent developments in the world.
Certainly, this thesis and its findings must be strengthened and re-examined
by future studies. Thus, the last part of this thesis is reserved for the suggestions for
the future urban studies.
i) As a result of fragmentation and isolation of social groups and classes in almost all
domains of the societal life, a process which has manifested itself in the spatial
pattern of the contemporary cities, (small scale) community formations are on the
agenda. Thus, social and political science students must focus on community
formations in order to comprehend the recent developments and changes in the
world.
ii) While doing this, special emphasis must be given to the use of space. Formation
of communities can be read as the social actors’ re-definition of their friends and
foes, which turns them into political actors. This political action is, indeed, visible at
different levels and settings. While the “clash of civilizations” thesis and other
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related perspectives could be regarded as the examples of the new mode of political
action at the global level, the formation of gated communities in cities is the example
of this phenomenon at the local level. What seems to be the main rationale in this
process is the re-regulation of the patterns of relationships. For re-definition and re-
regulation, geography and space is of considerable importance. For control,
discipline and hygiene, and terror against the foes, the use of space is one of the
primary aspects. In this sense, studies conducted on the issue of the “geo-political
space” that is the fusion of bio-politics and space, would be one of the major and
necessary contributions to the social and political sciences literature in the new
millennium.
iii) In this thesis it is implied that the formation of an “underclass” in Turkish
metropolises is a high probability in the near future. In the literature, there are some
studies pointing to this development. The decline of the networks among the poor
and the exclusion of previous members or not including new members who are
“useless” for the networks lie at the core of this process. Erder (1995, 112) observes
the situation as follows:
It is understood that, due to the hard conditions of the urban
environment, these relationships may get away from being self-
sacrificing solidarity networks and transform into selective and
hard power relations, especially for the ones living on the edge of
poverty. The existence of these relations may mean the
establishment of poverty for the ones who came to the city with
hope but could not enter into the networks and who are excluded
from these networks.
Thus, the formation of an ‘underclass” in Turkey is a pressing research
subject for social and political science students.
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